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MELISSA J. DURKEE

International Lobbying Law
abstract. An idiosyncratic array of international rules allows “consultants” to gain special
access to international officials and lawmakers. Historically, many of these consultants were public-interest associations like Amnesty International. For this reason, the access rules have been celebrated as a way to democratize international organizations, enhancing their legitimacy and that
of the rules they produce. But a focus on the classic public-law virtues of democracy and legitimacy
produces a theory at odds with the facts: Many of these international consultants are now industry
and trade associations like the World Coal Association, whose principal purpose is to lobby for
their corporate clients. The presence of these corporate lobbyists challenges the conventional view,
which I call strong legitimacy optimism, by focusing a set of longstanding critiques: Consultant
associations are not always representatives of the “global public” and consultation is not robust
participation in governance. Moreover, the access rules both overregulate and underregulate access
to lawmakers. This critique is particularly salient in the context of business lobbying, where the
access rules do not balance the costs and beneﬁts of business access to international lawmaking
and governance.
This Article introduces a theory of international lobbying law. Reframing the international
access rules as a body of lobbying regulations delivers explanatory and normative payoffs by identifying (1) the full array of actors who obtain access (public interest and private sector alike); (2)
the quantum of access that the current system delivers (informal lobbying, not participation in
governance); and (3) new regulatory strategies. Speciﬁcally, two regulatory models emerge. One
draws on the ﬂawed but best-available registration and disclosure norms of domestic lobbying
regulation. The other is a multistakeholder model pioneered by twenty-ﬁrst-century public-private partnership organizations. The Article develops an original typology to organize and identify
features of the international access rules across diverse international organizations, thereby clarifying the regulatory tradeoffs that accompany each choice. Perhaps counterintuitively, reformers
should likely eschew the most common middle-of-the-road access models—which are grounded
in the ﬂawed legitimacy optimism view—and instead choose among the two divergent regulatory
models, with that choice driven by organizational mission.
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introduction
In national jurisdictions like the United States, laws governing lobbying activity are well developed1 and subject to robust analysis and critique.2 Internationally, however, the regulatory environment for lobbying activity is highly idiosyncratic and undertheorized. In fact, legal rules that govern lobbying activity
at the international level have not yet been recognized as a body of lobbying law.
Rather, the patchwork of legal regimes is cast as a variety of “consultation” rules3
that allow individuals and groups to “democratize” international institutions by
offering to lawmakers and policymakers the diverse perspectives of a global polity.4 This input is said to be a “basic form of popular representation in the present-day world” and “a guarantee of . . . political legitimacy.”5 I call this conventional account “strong legitimacy optimism.”

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

For a history of U.S. federal lobbying laws, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Federal Lobbying Regulation: History Through 1954, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL 5 (William V. Luneburg et al. eds.,
4th ed. 2009); and Thomas M. Susman & William V. Luneburg, History of Lobbying Disclosure
Reform Proposals Since 1955, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra, at 23.
See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken & Alex Tausanovitch, A Public Finance Model for Lobbying: Lobbying, Campaign Finance, and the Privatization of Democracy, 13 ELECTION L.J. 75, 87-90 (2014)
(proposing reforms that would subsidize lobbying activity by public-interest groups); Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191, 216 (2012)
(proposing a “national economic welfare” rationale for lobbying regulation); Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 121 (2010) (reviewing efforts to redress
the “ﬁnancial vulnerabilities of democracy”); Maggie McKinley, Lobbying and the Petition
Clause, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1199 (2016) (asserting that current lobbying regulation and
practice violates the First Amendment’s Petition Clause); Zephyr Teachout, The Forgotten Law
of Lobbying, 13 ELECTION L.J. 4, 6 (2014) (noting that the scope of the constitutional lobbying
right is unclear).
See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 71 (“The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence.”); Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31 (July 25, 1996)
(making “arrangements for consultation” with NGOs). Following common usage in the literature, here “consultation” is used to refer to access to international institutions by nonstate
actors and “consultants” to those actors who gain such access. This follows the usage introduced in Article 71 of the Charter. Of course, “consultants” in this international context are
not contracted, employed, or compensated for their services.
See, e.g., We the Peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations and Global Governance: Rep. of
the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Soc’y Relations, U.N. Doc. A/58/817,
at 3 (June 11, 2004) [hereinafter Cardoso Report] (“The growing participation and inﬂuence
of non-State actors is enhancing democracy and reshaping multilateralism.”).
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, U.N. Sec’y-Gen., Keynote Address by Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali to the 47th DPI/NGO Conference (Sept. 8, 1994), in 47th Annual DPI/NGO
Conference, We the Peoples: Building Peace, at 3 (Sept. 8, 1994).

1746

international lobbying law

The lofty goals of this conventional account belie the quotidian reality of international lobbying. The truth is that the rules vary from institution to institution, with frameworks that appear to be driven principally by historical accident,
rather than coherent theory or principled design. Many of the international “consultants” are now industry and trade lobbyist associations like the World Coal
Association. These associations play a two-level game, lobbying both national
and international officials.6 They are neither democratic representatives of a
mythical “global public,” nor are they offered the meaningful quantum of access
that the strong legitimacy optimist model suggests. Yet private-sector actors can
possess valuable expertise and innovative perspectives that are sometimes suppressed by obsolete access rules or drowned out in the melee of an unstructured
process.
Thus, the facts show that the strong legitimacy optimist theory is descriptively ﬂawed and normatively limited. The result, as this Article argues, is a set
of legal regimes at the international level that both under- and overregulate international lobbying activities. On the one hand, these regimes can sacriﬁce
transparency, administrability, or effectiveness; on the other hand, they can unnecessarily expose international officials and lawmakers to capture.7 This matters to both international and national law, as international legal rules can be
implemented within national jurisdictions and shape choices by domestic regulators.8 In contemporary parlance, when it comes to regulating global business
lobbying, there is plenty of room to make “[e]verything that’s working . . . better,” to ﬁx what is not working, and to do away with obsolete rules.9
The Article develops a theory of international lobbying law. The theory begins with a critique, challenging the well-established but mistaken assumption
in international law that consultation with nonstate actors is, as a formal matter,
6.

7.
8.

9.

See generally Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,
42 INT’L ORGS. 427 (1988) (theorizing that the negotiating behavior of national leaders reﬂects
the dual and simultaneous pressures of international and domestic political games).
See infra Section II.A, Part IV.
See Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law,
72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 497-500 (2005) (observing that “much of international law is obeyed
primarily because domestic institutions create mechanisms for ensuring that a state abides by
its international legal commitments”); see also Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of
Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167, 170 (1999) (conceiving of the sovereign state as an agent
of small interest groups); Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International Agreements,
44 VA. J. INT’L L. 501, 539 (2004) (“Governments may form treaties for many of the same reasons that they enact statutes—to achieve domestic goals.”).
Somini Sengupta, Nikki Haley Puts U.N. on Notice: U.S. Is ‘Taking Names,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
27, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/world/americas/nikki-haley-united-nations
.html [http://perma.cc/7HDM-ZX38] (“Everything that’s working we’re going to make it
better. Everything that’s not working we’re going to try and ﬁx. And anything that seems to
be obsolete and not necessary we’re going to do away with.” (quoting Ambassador Haley)).
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a means of democratizing international institutions. While the strong form of
this theory has fallen out of vogue in the legal scholarship, it still serves as the
theoretical foundation on which many of the access structures in international
organizations were built. The critique this Article develops is that strong legitimacy optimism is both descriptively inaccurate and unhelpful as a reform principle. In short, it obstructs (1) regulation that would prevent undue inﬂuence
and capture, as well as (2) development of multistakeholder institutions that
would incorporate meaningful private-sector input.
The lobbying framework offered in this Article better describes the actors
involved (diverse, often corporate); reﬂects the kinds of access that the rules afford (limited); and offers promising regulatory responses borrowed from national lobbying theory and jurisprudence, such as registration and disclosure. At
the same time, by illustrating that international lobbying access is currently quite
limited in scope, the theory also invites lawmakers to develop new non-lobbying
structures when those structures would better suit institutional purposes. Thus,
the lobbying theory facilitates more coherent regulation of lobbying activity,
and, at the same time, reveals the need for truly participatory public-private partnership structures when those will better respond to pressing global problems.
Finally, the Article maps these payoffs onto an original typology that organizes
lobbying rules across a diverse set of international institutions.
The Article thus contributes to, and simultaneously attempts to reframe, the
growing literature on the participation of nonstate actors in shaping the development of international law.10 In particular, this project contributes to incipient
10.

A ﬁrst literature, arising principally out of international relations, focuses on how nonstate
actors lobby at the national government level, thereby shaping a nation’s international preferences. See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORGS. 513 (1997) (elaborating liberal theory in international relations
and explaining that domestic constituencies construct state interests). Other accounts have
noted nonstate actor contributions to governance occurring beyond the state. See, e.g., PAUL
SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS
(2012) (developing a theory of global legal pluralism); KATERINA LINOS, THE DEMOCRATIC
FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY DIFFUSION: HOW HEALTH, FAMILY AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS SPREAD
ACROSS COUNTRIES (2013) (developing a theory of democratic policy diffusion); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2005) (conceptualizing this activity as trans-governmental networks); Gráinne De Búrca et al., Global Experimentalist Governance, 44 BRIT. J. POL.
SCI. 477 (2014) (developing a theory of “experimentalist” governance); Terence C. Halliday
& Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 3 (Terence
C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015) (developing a theory of transnational legal orders).
This project is situated in the context of a third literature, which notes nonstate contributions
to governance through international institutions. See, e.g., JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, THE IMPACT OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (2017) [hereinafter THE IMPACT OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW] (studying nonstate actor contributions to formal law); JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS
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literatures that seek to understand the ways one inﬂuential kind of nonstate actor—the business entity—is involved in the formal processes of intergovernmental development of law and policy.11 Notable contributions in this arena analyze
business lobbying in the context of individual treaties—such as climate treaties—
and the adoption of private standards into public agreements.12 However, the
literature that evaluates nonstate participation in lawmaking under the auspices
of “consultation” at international institutions has principally focused on

(2005) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS] (same); Kenneth W.
Abbott & David Gartner, Reimagining Participation in International Institutions, 8 J. INT’L L. &
INT’L REL. 1 (2012) (conceptualizing this activity as taking place through multistakeholder
structures); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation
Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deﬁcit, 42 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 501 (2009) (conceptualizing this activity as cooperative public-private mechanisms and projects); Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 2005, at 15 (conceptualizing this activity as administrative action).
11. See Gregory C. Shaffer, How Business Shapes Law: A Socio-Legal Framework, 42 CONN. L. REV.
147, 150 (2009) (proposing this area of research); Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International
Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1595-1601 (2011) (noting a lack of information about the degree and
effect of corporate participation in international lawmaking). There are a number of more
robust contributions in political science, international relations, and sociology. See, e.g., JOHN
BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000) (sociology); THE
POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009) (political science); PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (A. Claire Cutler et al. eds., 1999)
(international relations).
12. See, e.g., TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF
REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2011) (reviewing delegation of regulatory power to
international private-sector standard-setting organizations); Markus Wagner, Regulatory
Space in International Trade Law and International Investment Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 56-58
(2014) (describing a mechanism whereby the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement
incorporates privately created international standards); David Zaring, Informal Procedure,
Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 547, 548-50 (2005) (describing
the entrenchment of international regulatory standardization through bureaucratic cooperation). A separate robust literature responds to institutionalized efforts to engage the business
sector through the Global Compact, the Ruggie Principles, and a potential Business and Human Rights treaty. See generally Kishanthi Parella, Treaty Penumbras, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 275
(2017) (reviewing this literature).
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NGOs,13 and downplayed or underrecognized any business presence in this
group.14
Here, I show that business involvement as “consultants” or “observers” in
institutions across the UN is a broad phenomenon.15 It is also an area that is
currently facing a signiﬁcant degree of controversy and change, as exempliﬁed
by reform proposals recently lodged at the World Health Organization (WHO)
and the United Nations Commission on International Trade (UNCITRAL).16
The reform proposals respond to the ambivalent nature of business contributions. On the one hand, welcoming and facilitating business input is essential in
many instances, when business entities offer expertise, develop technical standards, facilitate politically neutral solutions, offer funding for important global
projects, or serve as essential stakeholders whose acceptance will be necessary to
a rule’s success. On the other hand, fears of undue business inﬂuence, capture,
and other forms of subversion of regulatory processes are justiﬁed when proﬁtseeking motives conﬂict with public regulatory agendas. Perhaps as a result of
that essential ambivalence, there is no consistent regulatory response to business
lobbying across international institutions, either within or outside of the UN.
The current international legal context is further muddied by the instability
of settled law and institutions, as exempliﬁed by unfolding phenomena like

13.

For representative discussions, see, for example, Kenneth Anderson, “Accountability” as “Legitimacy”: Global Governance, Global Civil Society and the United Nations, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
841, 846, 890 (2011) (arguing that NGOs serve as their own gatekeepers and confer legitimacy
on themselves); David Gartner, Beyond the Monopoly of States, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 595 (2010)
(advocating for more NGO participation in lawmaking); and Edith Brown Weiss, The Rise or
the Fall of International Law?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 358 (2000) (contending that “[p]articipation by non-State actors in the international legal system greatly enhances [the] accountability [of the international legal system]”). For reviews of the literature, see Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 348, 365–66
(2006); and Peter J. Spiro, Accounting for NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 161, 161 n.2 (2002) (“Reﬂecting the rise of non-state actors, the academic and policy literature on NGOs has itself
exploded.”).
14. See Melissa J. Durkee, Astroturf Activism, 69 STAN. L. REV. 201 (2017) (noting that a literature
regarding the role of businesses in lobbying through accreditation at international institutions
has not yet matured and making an initial foray into this topic).
15. See infra Section I.A for a preliminary discussion and Part IV for a more fulsome treatment.
16. See U.N. Director-General, Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors, World Health
Org. [WHO], U.N. Doc. A69/6 (May 18, 2016) (providing a draft framework with alternative
provisions proposed by state parties); Claire R. Kelly, The Politics of Legitimacy in the UNCITRAL Working Methods, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 106, 119
(Tomer Broude et al. eds., 2011). The WHO’s framework was ﬁnalized on May 28, 2016.
World Health Org., Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors, WHA69.10 (May 28,
2016) [hereinafter WHO, Framework].
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Brexit,17 the threat of African withdrawals from the International Criminal
Court,18 and announcements by the current U.S. executive and other populist
leaders of bold reformist agendas that include proposals to exit major international agreements.19 The potential retreat from globalism challenges the postWorld War II consensus, and a rise of geopolitical multipolarity threatens to disrupt the success of hallowed international institutions.20 But uncertainty and
change also present opportunities to reconsider key features of the current order.
How do nonstate actors participate in the process of international lawmaking,
and how should they? What is the theory that justiﬁes opening or closing the
doors to these actors? What structures might best regulate nonstate participation, and, in particular, business lobbying? This Article offers a theory capable
of producing new answers to these questions. It focuses reforms on developing
the means to capture important informational and practical contributions of all
nonstate participants—whether they are classic public-interest NGOs, industry
or trade associations, business entities, or others—while restraining the risk of
capture.
The Article proceeds as follows. Parts I and II review the structure of the
access rules and existing scholarly accounts of them, highlighting a persistent
dilemma about whether, and if so to what extent, nonstate actor participation
contributes to the legitimacy or democratization of international organizations
and the rules they produce. The argument of Part I is that the conventional,
though contested, “legitimacy optimist” position is evident in the structure of
the access rules themselves, as this theory has guided reforms over time. Part II
then develops a critique of that conventional theory by showing that business
use of these access rules through trade or industry associations is a signiﬁcant—
17.

See, e.g., Phuong Tran, Brexit: How A Weakened European Union Affects NAFTA, 22 L. & BUS.
REV. AM. 281, 282 (2016).
18. See, e.g., Michael Plachta, 28th Summit of the African Union Backs Collective Withdrawal from
the International Criminal Court, 33 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 80 (2017).
19. See Karen Alter, The Future of International Law 9 (Nw. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 17-18,
2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3015177 [http://perma.cc/8952-MM2X] (noting Donald
Trump’s “insist[ence] that the United States will neither lead nor necessarily honor its commitments” among other forms of backlash against the international liberal order).
20. See, e.g., Michael Hirsh, Why the New Nationalists are Taking Over, POLITICO (June 27, 2016),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/nationalism-donald-trump-boris
-johnson-brexit-foreign-policy-xenophobia-isolationism-213995 [http://perma.cc/YN2G
-DWJC]; League of Nationalists, ECONOMIST (Nov. 19, 2016), http://www.economist.com
/news/international/21710276-all-around-world-nationalists-are-gaining-ground-why
-league-nationalists [http://perma.cc/P5YY-GP5E]; The Liberal Order of the Past 70 Years is
Under Threat, ECONOMIST (Sept. 21 2017), http://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts
/21729415-it-was-underpinned-movement-make-waging-aggressive-war-illegal-and
[http://perma.cc/P9RH-YE9F] (reviewing OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS (2017)).
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but underappreciated and undertheorized—feature of transnational business activity. The argument is not that this business activity is necessarily problematic,
but rather that the strong legitimacy optimist theory and existing access rules do
not adequately respond to potential risks.
In Part III, the Article offers a theory of international lobbying law and asserts that, as a descriptive theory, it better describes the nature of the access that
lobbying rules afford (not voting, not representative), and the actors who engage
in that lobbying activity (industry and trade associations as well as public-interest NGOs and others). As a prescriptive theory, it offers a productive analogy to
domestic lobbying law, which focuses on the beneﬁts nonstate actors can offer
lawmakers, and rules that are responsive to potential ills, with reporting and
transparency safeguards that cast sunlight on the lobbying process.
Finally, Part IV offers a typology that organizes lobbying rules along two dimensions: (1) the degree of inﬂuence nonstate actors can exercise within the regulatory or legislative process, and (2) the degree to which the rules classify actors
or groups and offer varied levels of access to each. The typology facilitates analysis of the array of existing access rules at diverse international organizations
within the Article’s international lobbying frame. It crystallizes regulatory
tradeoffs and potential reforms. In short, reframing “consultation” rules as international lobbying law should facilitate reform of outdated and undertheorized
rules that threaten the effectiveness of important international institutions. At
the same time, clarifying the limitations of lobbying should help pave the way
for more transformative participatory structures.
***
Before proceeding, one clariﬁcation is in order. The term “lobbying” is
fraught. It is not the argument of this Article that international access regimes
are plagued by inappropriate inﬂuences. Nor is the point to denigrate the valuable input that public-interest and private-sector groups can offer to the international law- and policy-making process. Rather, the theory and practice of lobbying regulation offers a useful model to understand and govern public
participation in lawmaking in the international context.
Indeed, this Article’s analysis unearths a strange contrast. On the one hand,
international commentators have expressed an outsized optimism about the potential of international access structures to improve governance: to enhance the
transparency of international organizations, to legitimize or democratize them,
or to offer them the perspectives of underrepresented groups. On the other hand,
observers of lobbying regulation in the U.S. and elsewhere seem to express an
unwarranted cynicism about the law and practice of lobbying. The following
analysis suggests that both reactions may be too extreme.
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i. the international access rules
The rules by which nonstate actors gain access to international lawmakers
and officials do not ﬂow from a single origin. That is, there is no treaty or other
uniﬁed source of law that prescribes how and when international organizations
should offer access to the public. There is no international Administrative Procedure Act to require a notice-and-comment process, or constitutional speech or
petition rights to protect access. Rather, the legal authority for each international
organization to permit nonstate access—to the extent that such authority exists—usually originates in the treaty or other foundational document that serves
as the organization’s charter. International organizations implement those charter provisions by developing access rules. Those rules are analogous to the procedural rules and standards that administrative agencies in national governments apply to regulate access. Because these charter provisions and their
resultant regulatory rules differ across international organizations, the result is a
patchwork of rules that vary from institution to institution.21 Perhaps it is because of this diversity and heterogeneity that no previous legal analysis has examined these rules as a single body of lobbying law,22 or organized them within
a single theoretical framework.23
Nevertheless, there is a clear starting point for such an analysis. Many of
these rules follow a template established by the United Nations’ Economic and

21.

See infra Part IV.
To be clear, NGO access to international lawmakers has been the subject of sustained interest
and analysis in law and political science, with great attention paid especially to the United
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) structure with which I begin this Article,
and consultation structures for environmental treaties like the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) and the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC). But these accounts do not conceive of these rules as a body of
international lobbying law. For a selection of leading accounts, see INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS, supra note 10; PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
supra note 11; SLAUGHTER, supra note 10; Abbott & Snidal, supra note 10, at 501; Anderson,
supra note 13; Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge
for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596 (1999); Steve Charnovitz, Two
Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183 (1997);
Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115
YALE L.J. 1490 (2006); Gartner, supra note 13; Kingsbury et al., supra note 10; Kal Raustiala,
The “Participatory Revolution” in International Environmental Law, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537
(1997); Peter J. Spiro, Non-Governmental Organizations and Civil Society, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 770 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007).
23. See infra Part IV for the organizational framework this Article offers.
22.
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Social Council (ECOSOC), which has implemented rules pursuant to a statutory mandate in the UN Charter.24 This Part introduces those ECOSOC rules,
identiﬁes the strong legitimacy optimist theory, and demonstrates how that conventional theory has become embedded as a normative principle into the access
rules themselves. In doing so, the Part lays a foundation for the critique to come.
A. Introducing the Access Rules
The ECOSOC accreditation system offers a seminal example of how international access rules work. The ECOSOC regulatory structure is important because it was developed early in the life of the UN and thus has inspired path
dependence among other international access structures, serving as a blueprint
for many of them.25 It also functions as a gatekeeper for a number of international organizations within the UN system.26 That is, to gain access to these latter organizations, an association must ﬁrst obtain access to ECOSOC.
The ECOSOC access rules are authorized by the UN Charter. Article 71 of
the Charter empowers ECOSOC to “make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters
within its competence.”27 The negotiating history of this provision is illuminating. About twelve hundred NGO representatives were present in San Francisco
for the signing of the NGO charter at the end of World War II.28 Some of these
NGOs were invited consultants to national delegations, and others simply traveled to the conference to see if they could persuade the delegates to adopt their
agendas.29 One of these agendas was to obtain a formal status within the new
United Nations.30 During the League of Nations era, before World War II,
NGOs had worked closely and cooperatively with the League in many aspects of

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

30.

U.N. Charter art. 71.
See infra Part IV.
See id.
U.N. Charter art. 71.
Charnovitz, supra note 22, at 251.
See Bill Seary, The Early History: From the Congress of Vienna to the San Francisco Conference, in
‘THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD’: THE INFLUENCE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
IN THE UN SYSTEM 15, 25-26 (Peter Willetts ed., 1996).
See Charnovitz, supra note 22, at 251 (reporting that an NGO consultant sought “a provision
on NGOs in the U.N. Charter,” an idea that had not been previously considered by state delegates at the Dumbarton Oaks conference); see also Seary, supra note 29, at 27 (noting that
“the US government gave in to pressure from the NGO consultants and accepted the idea”
that NGOs should have an official role in ECOSOC).
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its work in what was dubbed at the time the “League Method” of interaction.31
That League Method was an informal practice rather than a statutorily sanctioned relationship, so NGOs sought to have this practice formalized, and perhaps even expanded, under the new UN Charter.32
The San Francisco NGO lobbyists partly succeeded in that the UN Charter
contained the Article 71 provision authorizing ECOSOC to “consult” with
NGOs.33 But in a larger sense, the NGOs were unsuccessful in that this provision
formalized a clearly subordinate role for NGOs in comparison with international
organizations and nation-states. NGOs did not attain any voting privileges,
rights to participate in treaty drafting, or any other formal participatory rights.
The term “consultation” is not deﬁned in the Charter and so the nature of the
relationship—and indeed, whether ECOSOC formed such consultative relationships at all—was purely at ECOSOC’s discretion. The UN Charter also failed to
formalize relationships between NGOs and any other organ of the UN besides
ECOSOC, like the General Assembly or the Security Council.34
Empowered by Article 71, ECOSOC has adopted a set of regulations enabling
NGOs to apply to become accredited “for consultation with” the Council.35 In
the Council’s conception, consultative status serves dual purposes: to assist the
UN in gathering relevant expertise from nongovernmental sources and to give
members of civil society the opportunity to have access to governance functions

31.

32.
33.
34.
35.

See Charnovitz, supra note 22, at 221-237, 245-46 (describing the League-era context in which
voluntary associations deﬁned and presented issues for the League’s consideration; served as
“insiders working directly with government officials and international civil servants to address” international problems, principally through policy conferences; and lobbied those in
power). Indeed, voluntary, issue-oriented associations became active in inﬂuencing international law much before the League period, “emerg[ing] at the end of the eighteenth century
and bec[oming] international by 1850. By the end of the nineteenth century, there was a pattern of private international cooperation evolving into public international action . . . . Behind
many [early international organizations] stood idealistic and active NGOs.” Id. at 212.
Id. at 251.
U.N. Charter art. 71.
See generally U.N. Charter (referring to NGOs only in Article 71).
The Council has passed various resolutions to govern NGO access to the UN pursuant to
Article 71. Economic and Social Council Res. 43 (June 21, 1946) (making arrangements for
consultation with NGOs); Economic and Social Council Res. 288 (X) (Feb. 27, 1950) (codifying privileges and practices relating to NGOs that had developed between 1946 and 1950);
Economic and Social Council Res. 1296 (XLIV) (May 23, 1968); Economic and Social Council
Res. 1996/31, supra note 3 (offering an updated set of rules that remain in effect as of this
writing). For narrative descriptions of the role of these resolutions, see 2 THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1797 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012); and THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 904-05 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1st ed.
1994).
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and to express their opinions.36 ECOSOC has updated the regulations several
times in an attempt to better serve these dual purposes and respond to perceived
deﬁcits.37 The rules currently in force were last updated in 1996.38
The 1996 rules contain a variety of criteria that focus on how well an NGO
seeking access represents its members, and whether it has internal governance
mechanisms that make its representatives accountable to that membership. As a
preliminary manner, the association must have “aims and purposes” that support
“the spirit, purposes and principles” of the UN and “promote” the UN’s work.39
It must be able to establish the accountability and representativeness of its internal governance mechanisms through indicia such as “an established headquarters”;40 “a democratically adopted constitution” providing for a representative
process to set policy;41 a responsive “executive organ”;42 and documented “authority to speak for its members through its authorized representatives.”43 Organizations must be nonproﬁts and obtain their funding from “national affiliate[] [organizations] . . . or from individual members.”44 Finally, the
organization must represent its particular ﬁeld by “be[ing] of recognized standing within the particular ﬁeld of its competence or of a representative character.”45
The menu of privileges offered to accredited associations includes access to
information, opportunities to submit oral and written comments, and informal
lobbying opportunities. For example, accredited organizations may obtain UN
36.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

44.

45.

See Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 3, ¶ 20 (“[C]onsultative arrangements are to be made, on the one hand, for the purpose of enabling the Council or one of its
bodies to secure expert information or advice from organizations . . . and, on the other hand,
to enable international, regional, subregional and national organizations that represent important elements of public opinion to express their views.”).
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
See Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 3.
See id. ¶¶ 2-3.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11. Resolution 1996/31 also includes a repetitive catchall provision: the organization must
possess “a representative structure and . . . appropriate mechanisms of accountability to its
members, who shall exercise effective control over its policies and actions through the exercise
of voting rights or other appropriate democratic and transparent decision-making processes.”
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 13. There is a loophole: when an organization is ﬁnanced from other sources, it must
explain to the satisfaction of the Council (via its Committee on NGOs) the organization’s
reasons for not meeting these requirements. Id.
See id. ¶ 9.
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“grounds passes” and admission to UN-sponsored treaty-making conferences,
both of which offer opportunities for informal dialogue with national delegates
and international officials.46 They may also send representatives to sit as observers at meetings of ECOSOC, its commissions, and other subsidiary bodies; present written or oral comments to international officials; receive meeting agendas; and propose agenda items.47 Organizations are accredited in three different
tiers, obtaining access and lobbying privileges that correspond to the organization’s tier. “General” consultants are offered the broadest range of access privileges, while “special” and “roster” organizations receive fewer.48
The ECOSOC framework has been replicated around the UN system, with
other agencies adopting similar access regulations. A few organizations have a
parallel Article 71 in their organizational charters, authorizing a consultation system for those organizations in the same way as the UN Charter authorizes one
for ECOSOC.49 Many, like ECOSOC, will minimally screen organizations in an
initial accreditation procedure; a number will divide associations into rough categories that correspond to the association’s breadth and depth of expertise across
relevant subject areas and afford tailored access privileges to each, as does
ECOSOC. However, ECOSOC’s model is by no means the only way for international institutions to incorporate outside input. Another method, which has been
embraced by organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), is to
46.

See Accreditation, UNITED NATIONS OFF. GENEVA, http://www.unog.ch/ngo/accreditation
[http://perma.cc/Y95U-BUMA].
47. Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 3, ¶¶ 27-30, 32(a).
48. Id. ¶¶ 21–26; see also STEPHEN TULLY, CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 66
(2007) (reviewing the tiered consultation structure); Charnovitz, supra note 22, at 267 (same).
“General” status is reserved for organizations that are the most global in footprint and pursue
the broadest missions: they “are concerned with most of [ECOSOC’s] activities”; “can
demonstrate . . . sustained contributions . . . to the achievement of [UN] objectives”; and are
“broadly representative of major segments of society in a large number of countries.” Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 3, ¶ 22; see also Kal Raustiala, NGOs in
International Treaty-Making, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 150, 156 n.24 (Duncan B.
Hollis ed., 2012) (noting that NGOs with general status “tend to be fairly large, established
international NGOs with a broad geographical reach”). “Special” status is for organizations
that are concerned with “a few of the ﬁelds of activity” the Council pursues. Economic and
Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 3, ¶ 23; see also Raustiala, supra, at 156 n.24 (stating
that NGOs with Special consultative status “tend to be smaller and more recently established”). Finally, “Roster” status falls short of full consultancy status and is granted to NGOs
that do not qualify for the other two categories but may make “occasional and useful contributions” to the UN’s work. Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 3, ¶ 24; see
also Raustiala, supra, at 157 n.24 (“Organizations that apply for consultative status but do not
ﬁt in any of the other categories are usually included in the Roster. These NGOs tend to have
a rather narrow and/or technical focus.”).
49. See, e.g., Constitution of the World Health Organization art. 71, July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 2679,
14 U.N.T.S. 185.
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solicit input from particular associations at particular decision points, rather than
maintaining a standing bench of consultants. Other, more innovative institutions, like the International Labour Organization (ILO), UN Women, and the
GAVI Alliance, offer full membership—and even voting rights—to nonstate actors. UNCITRAL demonstrates another unique model, allowing consultants to
participate in a consensus decision-making procedure, thereby affording robust
participatory rights to nonstate actors, even though it does not offer full membership to those entities. These variations are explored in greater length in Part
IV. This preliminary introduction of the ECOSOC rules is offered not to serve
as a full analysis of those rules but to lay a foundation for the theory and critique
that follows.
B. Theorizing the Rules
Can consultation “democratize” international organizations, bolstering their
authority to undertake global governance? The question has been the subject of
robust debates in law and political science, and it has signiﬁcant practical consequences. If the answer is yes—the access rules can enhance an organization’s
democratic legitimacy—then international organizations can potentially claim
broader authority than that delegated by national governments. The consequences of this position are particularly sensitive in a political milieu like that
which exists at the time of this writing—an era of nationalist retraction, growing
multipolarity, and skepticism of the broadly claimed authority of multilateral institutions. Moreover, the answer to the descriptive question brings normative
consequences. If input from nonstate entities is legitimizing and democratizing,
then access rules should likely attend to the representativeness and accountability of the entities that offer that input. If, on the other hand, input from NGOs
cannot confer on international organizations additional authority or legitimacy,
then regulation of nonstate access is susceptible to a different, more pluralistic
and pragmatic, set of reforms.
The following sections divide this question into its descriptive and normative
aspects, and review each debate in turn.
1. The Descriptive Dimension: Can Consultation Confer Legitimacy?
The ﬁrst debate is descriptive: can consultation confer on international organizations additional legitimacy or a broader democratic mandate than those
organizations would have without it? There are three responses to this question:
legitimacy optimism in strong and moderate forms, and legitimacy pessimism.
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a. Strong Legitimacy Optimism
The strong legitimacy optimist view asserts that nonstate actor input
through the access rules can indeed contribute to the legitimacy of international
legal rules.50 This contribution is thought to be particularly valuable because international organizations struggle with legitimacy deﬁcits.51 The argument is
that international organizations lack “democratic legitimacy” because they cannot be held accountable through the ballot box.52 Indeed, they could not be democratically accountable unless there was some sort of global parliamentary system.53 Rather, international organizations derive their legitimacy derivatively,
through member states: they only have the authority granted to them by member states, and cannot claim a broader mandate. 54
Nonstate actor input through the access structures is said to be a means by
which international organizations can transcend that limitation and claim to
speak and function directly on behalf of the global public. NGOs are imagined
to be representatives of that global public. Thus, NGO consultation is understood to be a “basic form of popular representation”55 and a democratizing inﬂuence56 because it offers international organizations a form of quasi-democratic
legitimacy,” or at least “a plausible connection to a global constituency” beyond
the governments of the member states.57 This nongovernmental input enables
organizations to receive the views of a broad cross-section of individuals advocating for different social causes through their NGO representatives, and thus
contributes directly to the international organization’s governance mandate.

50.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

For a description of this basic position, see Kenneth Anderson, Global Governance: The Problematic Legitimacy Relationship Between Global Civil Society and the United Nations 16 (Am. Univ.
Wash. Coll. of Law Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2008-71, 2008), http://ssrn
.com/abstract_id=1265839 [http://perma.cc/RXZ7-WW6E].
See id. at 26.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 26.
See id. at 16 n.46.
Boutros-Ghali, supra note 5, at 3.
See Cardoso Report, supra note 4, at 3 (“The growing participation and inﬂuence of non-State
actors is enhancing democracy and reshaping multilateralism.”).
Anderson, supra note 50, at 16; see also TERRY MACDONALD, GLOBAL STAKEHOLDER DEMOCRACY: POWER AND REPRESENTATION BEYOND LIBERAL STATES 193 (2008) (arguing that “nonelectoral mechanisms of authorization and accountability could potentially be employed to
confer democratic legitimacy upon a range of agents of public power in global politics, including [international organizations]”).
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Thus, the strong view has both descriptive and normative dimensions. Descriptively, the view asserts that international organizations act with a broader and
more legitimate mandate when they respond to the views and opinions of global
publics and not just their governmental representatives. Thus, a mechanism to
solicit and incorporate those views serves to confer excess legitimacy and democratic mandate on international organizations. Normatively, then, in this view
the “consultation” or other mechanisms for incorporating the views of nonstate
actors are beneﬁcial to global governance.
On that latter normative point, Steven Charnovitz argues that an individual
can “delegate the function of representing himself,” to an NGO.58 Because this
choice is voluntary, “[o]ne should not assume that on any particular issue . . . an
individual has delegated more decisionmaking authority to an elected politician
rather to an NGO.”59 Conversely, the voting power does not equate to an individual choice of elected representatives, as the individual’s choice may not prevail.60 Charnovitz’s point is that this representative role of NGOs should justify
their access to international organizations and officials, and militate against excluding them from processes and deliberation that lead to international lawmaking.61
In sum, the strong legitimacy optimism position suggests that nonstate actors contribute to international lawmaking and governance through their function as representatives of the interests of individuals.
b. Moderate Legitimacy Optimism
Moderate legitimacy optimism does not claim that the consultation mechanism can directly confer a democratic or representational mandate on international organizations. But it does assert that opening a law- and policy-making
process to nonstate groups can enhance legitimacy and assist an organization in
governing effectively.62 The claim is thus more modest and descriptive than
58.
59.
60.
61.

62.

Steve Charnovitz, The Illegitimacy of Preventing NGO Participation, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 891,
905 (2011).
Id.
Id.
See id. Relatedly, Terry MacDonald has proposed a “Global Stakeholder Democracy” model,
which he suggests could employ the representation of “multi-stakeholder” interests by
NGOs—either to supplement or to substitute for the representation of nation-state constituencies by governments. MACDONALD, supra note 57, at 14.
See, e.g., Esty, supra note 22, at 1515-23 (outlining various alternatives to democratic accountability that may serve as sources of potential legitimacy for international organizations); Kingsbury et al., supra note 10, at 15, 17 (identifying an “embryonic ﬁeld of global administrative

1760

international lobbying law

strong legitimacy optimism. The central claim is that access and consultation
mechanisms can be especially useful when international organizations do not
have adequate enforcement mechanisms to impose their legal rules by force on
recalcitrant nation-states. Thus, offering access and consultation opportunities
to nonstate actors can assist an international organization in gathering legitimacy that will enhance the persuasive power of the rules the organization develops.63 The idea is that offering different groups opportunities to submit input
during a rulemaking process can enhance the credibility of international rules
among those groups and build support for the rules among national governments, which may otherwise be subject to lobbying efforts by disaffected groups.
Finally, allowing private groups access to the rulemaking process potentially can
enhance transparency by allowing those groups to disseminate information
about it to their members.
For example, Claire Kelly builds on accounts by Robert Keohane and Joseph
Nye to describe legitimacy as a product of inputs (“the means by which constituents participate in [international organizations], e.g., representation, inclusiveness, or process”)64 and outputs (“substantive outcomes, e.g., trade liberalization . . . or fairness, and whether goals set by the [international organizations]
themselves are reached, i.e., is the [international organization] effective”).65
Thus, in the input/output legitimacy account advanced by Kelly and others, input legitimacy focuses on the representativeness of the rulemaking, including
participation by those who will be affected by the rule, and the fairness and transparency of the deliberative process.66 Output legitimacy focuses on the outcomes
of the rulemaking. Is a rule “fair, just, well ordered, universally accepted, or supportive of a particular goal”?67 Output legitimacy also inquires whether the

63.
64.

65.
66.

67.

law” that has bolstered the legitimacy of international organizations through “standards of
transparency, participation, reasoned decision, . . . legality, and . . . effective review”).
See Melissa J. Durkee, Persuasion Treaties, 99 VA. L. REV. 63, 97-104 (2013).
Claire R. Kelly, Institutional Alliances and Derivative Legitimacy, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 605, 613–
14 (2008) (citing Robert Keohane & Joseph Nye, Between Centralization and Fragmentation:
The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy 9–10 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t Working Paper Series, Paper No. RWP01-004, 2001),
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=262175 [http://perma.cc/RVV7-P2MD]).
Kelly, supra note 16, at 123.
Id.; see also Esty, supra note 22, at 1524 (proposing that international organization legitimacy
can be improved by using traditional administrative law devices, such as notice, comment,
and power sharing).
Kelly, supra note 16, at 124 (arguing that since a better, more inclusive, and more transparent
process can enhance legitimacy, an important question is whether NGOs help or hinder this).
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norms are “useful,” and notes that usefulness can often be enhanced by the expertise of the inputs.68 In short, those who measure input/output legitimacy accept the premise that consultation with outsiders can enhance the legitimacy of
an organization and the rules it produces. For this reason, I characterize these
accounts as moderately legitimacy optimistic.
Moderate legitimacy optimism thus characterizes intellectual movements
like global administrative law, which works to identify groups that can offer expertise and “technocratic competence” that enhance the output legitimacy of various global administrative projects. In addition, Kenneth Abbott and David
Gartner celebrate participation by a mix of groups, or “multiple, countervailing
interests—such as NGOs, business groups, and technical experts,” as a way of
balancing the deliberative process.69 Abbott and Gartner see this diversity as a
means of preserving equilibrium and preventing capture of lawmakers by any
one group.
In sum, according to accounts that advance moderate legitimacy optimism,
consultation with private groups—whether they be experts, NGOs, businesses,
or others—can enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of international organizations and their rulemaking processes. These accounts stop short of strong legitimacy optimism because they do not assert that this consultation legitimizes
organizations by transforming them into direct representatives of any particular
group of people.
c. Legitimacy Pessimism
Legitimacy pessimism starkly contrasts with strong legitimacy optimism. It
expresses the view that international organizations and NGOs have been caught
in a “closed legitimation-circle”70: NGOs confer apparent legitimacy on international organizations by claiming to speak for populations affected by the decisions of those organizations. This allows international organizations to claim the
authority of representational quasi-democracy. In turn, those international organizations legitimate the work of the NGOs, which exist only to advocate for a

68.

Id.; see also Abbott & Gartner, supra note 10, at 29 (noting the value of expertise for “policy
formulation and legitimacy”).
69. See Abbott & Gartner, supra note 10, at 26.
70. Anderson, supra note 50, at 34.
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cause before the international organizations.71 The two exist in reciprocal symbiosis in a closed loop, with no external checks on the accuracy of their claims.72
Thus NGOs are seen as “self-appointed spokesmen for their cause” or even “a
self-serving coterie of elitists.”73 The legitimacy pessimist position observes that
because NGOs are unelected, they cannot be truly representative of any particular group of people and “need not answer to the broad public they claim to represent.”74 Kenneth Anderson is a key proponent of this position, which he articulates in the following way:
[T]o ask about accountability is really to ask whether NGOs are representative of those they claim (or once claimed) to represent and whether
they merit the legitimacy that they claim such representativeness confers.
In this sense, to ask about accountability is [to ask] . . . whether a basis
exists for them to be invested with such power in the ﬁrst place . . . . [I]f
it is on the basis of representing “people” or “peoples” or “the world’s
Peoples,” then we should not . . . presume the quite radical conclusion
that they have a legitimate claim to “represent” and account for the interests and desires and values of all these “people” in the ﬁrst place.75
Rather than enhancing the legitimacy of international organizations, these
NGOs at best have a neutral effect on international processes, and at worst challenge the legitimacy or effectiveness of them. At times, they have even challenged
the legitimacy of the national governments that delegate power to international
institutions. In fact, as Kenneth Anderson notes, fascist regimes such as Mussolini’s or Franco’s also treated civil society organizations as “representative, intermediary organizations between the people and the states” to try to make up for
their lack of “ballot box legitimacy.” These fascist regimes therefore supported
supposed civil society organizations as substitutes. This self-legitimating circle

71.

72.
73.
74.
75.

Similar concerns have been aired in the U.S. domestic context. See, e.g., Moshe Cohen-Eliya
& Yoav Hammer, Nontransparent Lobbying as a Democratic Failure, 23 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV.
265, 268 n.12 (2011) (citing David Lowery, Why do Organized Interests Lobby? A Multi-Goal,
Multi-Context Theory of Lobbying, 39 POLITY 29, 36-37 (2007)) (noting that organizations frequently lobby even when they do not expect success for the purpose of demonstrating to their
supporters that they are active and to justify continued support).
Anderson, supra note 50, at 34.
MACDONALD, supra note 57, at 4 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 4 (noting concerns about NGO representativeness and accountability).
Kenneth Anderson, What NGO Accountability Means—and Does Not Mean, 103 AM. J. INT’L L.
170, 176 (2009).
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cannot substitute, Anderson and others claim, for authentic democratic legitimacy.76
2. The Normative Dimension: Strong Legitimacy Optimism as Reform
Principle
Strong legitimacy optimism has shaped legal reforms. Speciﬁcally, because
legitimacy optimism operates from the descriptive premise that consultation can
confer legitimacy on international organizations, it carries with it a normative
claim that reforms should therefore operate to enhance the access, representativeness, and accountability of consultant groups. Thus, strong legitimacy optimism led to reforms at ECOSOC in 1996 that expanded access rights for NGOs77
and that attempted to enhance the representative nature of NGO participation
as consultants. For example, Resolution 1996/31 introduced a number of regulations aimed at ensuring that NGOs actually represent the interests of their
members and that NGO governance documents evidence and safeguard this representational character:
10. The organization shall . . . have a democratically adopted constitution, . . . which shall provide for the determination of policy by a conference, congress or other representative body and for an executive organ
responsible to the policy-making body[;]
11 . . . . shall have authority to speak for its members through its authorized representatives[;]
12 . . . . [and] shall have a representative structure and possess appropriate mechanisms of accountability to its members, who shall exercise effective control over its policies and actions through the exercise of voting
rights or other appropriate democratic and transparent decision-making
processes.78
The 1996 reform also responded to concerns about the problem of
overrepresentation of NGOs from the Global North and underrepresentation

76.

Anderson, supra note 50, at 24 (citing John Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 205, 205 (2000), for the proposition that “[i]t is . . . precisely the detachment from governments that makes international civil society so troubling, at least for
democracies” because it “posits ‘interests’ . . . as legitimate actors along with popularly elected
governments”).
77. Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 3.
78. Id. ¶¶ 10-12.
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from the Global South. Resolution 1996/31 noted that ECOSOC sought “just,
balanced, effective and genuine involvement of non-governmental organizations
from all regions and areas of the world,”79 and in particular, greater participation
from developing countries and countries in transition.80
The twelve-member Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations that considered further reforms to the ECOSOC access structure
in 2004 continued to embrace strong legitimacy optimism as a principle of reform.81 For example, the report they produced (known as the Cardoso Report)
advocated “forging stronger links between [NGOs at] the local and global levels,
which would help overcome democratic deﬁcits in global governance,”82 and
again focused on representational disparities between the Global North and
South. Nevertheless, the Cardoso panel’s ﬁndings also reported concerns by national governments about the “legitimacy, accountability and ‘hidden agendas’”
of NGO consultants:
Many of the accredited NGOs are perceived as lobbyists rather than
“true” stakeholders. Most are seen as not accountable while demanding
higher government accountability. Many governments feel they, being
elected, are the legitimate representatives of society.83
The concerns aired in the 1996 reforms and Cardoso Report reveal a fundamental normative assumption that it is NGOs’ democratizing and representational qualities that qualify them to participate as consultants to international
organizations. For example, if the principal concern were to gather sufficient expertise to develop an efficient or workable rule, the principal analysis would not
be whether an NGO represents its members, but whether the organization proffers representatives with scientiﬁc, technocratic, or other qualiﬁcations.
After signiﬁcant attention in the 1990s and 2000s, scholarly promotion of
strong legitimacy optimism as either a descriptive theory or principle of reform
has ebbed. As far as the legal rules themselves, the UN has not responded to the
reform proposals of the Cardoso Report, and the access rules continue to require

79.

Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶¶ 6-7.
81. Cardoso Report, supra note 4.
82. Press Brieﬁngs by Panel on UN-Civil Society Relations, UNITED NATIONS (June 21, 2004), http://
www.un.org/press/en/2004/Cardoso062104.doc.htm [http://perma.cc/5MGD-B8MU].
83. UN System and Civil Society - An Inventory and Analysis of Practices: Background Paper for
the Secretary-General’s Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations Relations with Civil
Society, GLOBAL POL’Y F. (May 2003) [hereinafter Inventory], http://www.globalpolicy.org
/component/content/article/226/32330.html [http://perma.cc/QT74-W7XE].
80.
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features of NGOs—like constitutional governance and democratically selected
representatives—that appear to be premised on strong legitimacy optimism. The
signiﬁcance of these regulatory choices persists. In addition to the fact that there
are roughly ﬁve thousand associations accredited with ECOSOC,84 an array of
other international organizations have followed in ECOSOC’s path by adopting
the ECOSOC structure, permitting basic forms of “consultation,” and requiring
basic forms of representation.
ii. why strong legitimacy optimism fails
The primary reason for the tenacity of strong legitimacy optimism as a guide
to regulatory design appears to be the persistent and deeply entrenched idea that
the nonstate groups who obtain access this way ﬁt a certain mold. The idea is
that these participants are virtuous nonproﬁt groups championing social goods
and the views of individuals, minorities, and social groups who are not adequately represented by national delegations. This is not to say that this premise
has gone without challenge. Principally, however, as the previous Section described, responses to perceived deﬁcits in accountability and representativeness
have consisted of proposals to further promote participation by virtuous groups,
rather than to supplant the “consultation as democracy” idea at the heart of
strong legitimacy optimism.
As it turns out, however, the nonstate groups gaining access to international
organizations are very diverse. For example, business groups make signiﬁcant
use of the access rules alongside the classic public-interest actors that the conventional account imagines. The presence of business actors brings the existing
criticisms of that frame into focus. This Part uses these facts to illustrate the descriptive inaccuracy of strong legitimacy optimism and the persistent access
problems it fails to address as a principle of reform. In short, while business lobbying appears to repudiate the premises of strong legitimacy optimism, businesses also contribute to the work of international organizations in socially beneﬁcial ways. The access rules do not respond appropriately to either of these
facts.
A. Explanatory Faults: The Question of Business
Business groups use the access rules to offer input to international organizations in both overt and covert modes. These facts show that the conventional

84.

NGO Branch, Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations, UNITED NATIONS DEP’T ECON.
& SOC. AFF., http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/displayAdvancedSearch.do?method=search&
sessionCheck=false [http://perma.cc/KPK8-KBJL].
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account fails in two ways. It mischaracterizes both the nature of the groups making use of the access structures and the nature of the access opportunities presented to these groups.
1. Overt Business Access85
Academic attention to the access rules has been focused principally on classic
public-interest NGOs. As Anderson articulates this orientation:
[T]he meaning of the term [civil society] in the international community
is reserved for politically “progressive” organizations, deﬁned in broad
terms as a leftwing politics and an orientation toward global governance
over merely democratic sovereign governance. The legion academic literature on global civil society largely assumes that it is about the leftwing
Human Rights Watch and Greenpeace . . . and that it is committed to
. . . the idea of global governance.86
Perhaps this scholarly focus arises from the fact that the accreditation opportunities have been of interest primarily to civil society groups seeking to advance
a particular cause (and usually, in Anderson’s view, a socially liberal one). Nevertheless, the accreditation structure is also a point of entry for international
business groups, who may consult on the same terms as the public-interest
NGOs, provided that the business group meets the accreditation criteria. In particular, in the ECOSOC context, the business group must be organized as a nonproﬁt and report “aims and purposes” consistent with ECOSOC’s purposes.87
Since ECOSOC’s own aims and purposes include economic development, many
private-sector groups can demonstrate such a link.
In fact, ECOSOC’s screening of would-be consultant groups is not focused
on determining which interests the group represents, aside from the bare determination that the group advances some elements of ECOSOC’s work. Nor do
the screening criteria focus on the makeup of the group’s membership, other
than to evaluate whether the group has some means of maintaining accountability to that membership. In practice, the rules have been interpreted to mean that

85.

This subsection draws substantially on a short essay previously published in AJIL Unbound as
part of a Symposium on Industry Associations in Transnational Legal Ordering. See Melissa
J. Durkee, Industry Lobbying and “Interest Blind” Access Norms at International Organizations, 111
AJIL UNBOUND 119 (2017).
86. Anderson, supra note 50, at 32 (footnote omitted) (critiquing this view as excluding conservative and religious civil society groups).
87. See Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 2-3.
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an association’s members may be either individuals, businesses, or other entities.
Thus, business advocacy groups—trade and industry associations—may become
accredited as consultants to ECOSOC. In fact, they can become accredited alongside and on the same terms as NGOs who advance various social causes. However, individual businesses cannot become accredited to consult unless they are
organized as nonproﬁts.
Indeed, of the approximately 5,000 associations that are now accredited as
consultants to ECOSOC, a full ten percent self-report “business and industry”
as an area of expertise or ﬁeld of activity.88 That ﬁgure likely underreports the
total number of associations representing the private sector, as it merely reﬂects
the number of associations that explicitly report this focus. Examples of accredited business and industry associations include:

Global sectoral associations, such as the World Coal Association and the
World Nuclear Association;

Regional sectoral associations, such as the National Association of Home
Builders of the United States, the European Association of Automotive
Suppliers, and the Association of Latin American Railways; and

Generalist organizations, whether global or regional, such as the International Chamber of Commerce, the World Union of Small and Medium Enterprises, and the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and
Industrialists.
Many of these associations have disclosed that their principal organizational
purposes include lobbying. For example, the World Coal Association lists among
its goals that it aims to “[a]ssist in the creation of a political climate supportive
of action by governments” to use various kinds of coal technologies, and to educate policymakers about the beneﬁts of coal and the coal industry.89 The World
Nuclear Association “seeks to promote the peaceful worldwide use of nuclear

88.

NGO Branch, supra note 84. In the “Consultative status” ﬁeld, select “General,” “Special,” and
“Roster” and add them to the search ﬁeld; expand “Areas of expertise & Fields of activity”;
then select “Economic and Social” and add “Business and Industry” to search ﬁeld; designate
“search type” as “[a]ll the criteria above”; then search. Id. (listing 514 organizations that selected “business and industry” as of October 2017).
89. NGO Branch, World Coal Association, UNITED NATIONS DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFF., http://
esango.un.org/civilsociety/showProﬁleDetail.do?method=showProﬁleDetails&
sessionCheck=false&tab=3&proﬁleCode=1029 [http://perma.cc/B2CC-67G9].
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power.”90 The National Association of Home Builders of the United States seeks
to “[b]alance legislative, regulatory and judicial public policy.”91
Thus, business-promoting groups work alongside, and on equal terms with,
familiar public-interest NGOs like the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, and Heifer Project International. All of these accredited groups, public interest and private sector alike, enjoy the same potential menu of access privileges.
2. Covert Business Access
Businesses access international lawmakers and officials not just overtly,
through industry and trade associations, but also covertly. In a prior article, I
identiﬁed an “astroturf activism” phenomenon whereby “business entities gain
access to international lawmakers through front groups that obscure the identity
of the proﬁt-seeking enterprise.”92 One way businesses gain this covert access is
through grassroots mimicry: forming NGOs with nonproﬁt status and a mission
statement that obscures the association’s true agenda.93 John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos offer some choice examples of this phenomenon, noting the “National Wetlands Coalition,” which serves U.S. oil companies and real estate developers, and “Consumers for World Trade,” which was formed by a pro-GATT
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) industry coalition.94
In addition to forming astroturf groups, businesses have formed sponsorship or other close relationships with public-interest NGOs, suggesting some
degree of capture or—at minimum—inﬂuence.95 According to a study of one
hundred inﬂuential NGOs in 2013, 54% had at least one board member affiliated
with the tobacco industry, 56% with the arms industry, and 59% with the ﬁnance

90.

91.

92.
93.
94.
95.

NGO Branch, World Nuclear Association, UNITED NATIONS DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFF., http://
esango.un.org/civilsociety/showProﬁleDetail.do?method=showProﬁleDetails&
sessionCheck=false&tab=3&proﬁleCode=1047 [http://perma.cc/BK3B-HMPM].
NGO Branch, National Association of Home Builders of the United States, UNITED NATIONS
DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFF., http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/showProﬁleDetail.do?method
=showProﬁleDetails&sessionCheck=false&tab=3&proﬁleCode=6881 [http://perma.cc
/CGX6-BZBM].
Durkee, supra note 14, at 229.
Id. at 238.
BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 11, at 489.
Durkee, supra note 14, at 241-42.
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industry.96 Of the NGOs in the study, 40% have obtained accreditation at
ECOSOC.97
Businesses also access the accreditation structure covertly by capturing trade
associations.98 For example, in an effort to defeat the WHO’s tobacco regulation
efforts, multinational tobacco companies like Philip Morris and British American
Tobacco transformed the International Tobacco Growers’ Association (ITGA)
“from an underfunded and disorganized group of tobacco farmers into a highly
effective lobbying organization”99 purporting to speak on behalf of developingworld tobacco farmers. The ITGA lobbied the FAO, World Bank, and United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development “to oppose or undermine WHO
tobacco control activities.”100
3. The Signiﬁcance of Business Access
The presence of businesses among the groups who gain access to officials
and lawmakers through the access rules sharpens the critiques of the legitimacy
pessimists. That business groups are accredited NGOs in this context entails that
the persons NGOs represent are not just natural people but also juridical people—that is, business entities constituted by states. NGOs are not always even
purporting to be representatives of the “global public”; rather, some overtly advance the interests of corporate constituencies.101 Others do so non-transparently.102 As the previous subsections clariﬁed, trade and industry associations,
organized as nonproﬁts, can and do make use of international accreditation re-

96.

97.
98.
99.

100.
101.
102.

Id. at 242 (citing Fairouz El Tom, Diversity and Inclusion on NGO Boards: What the Stats Say,
GUARDIAN (May 7, 2013, 5:56 AM EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development
-professionals-network/2013/apr/29/diversity-inclusion-ngo-board [http://perma.cc
/M5VG-WY5K]).
Id.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 240-41 (quoting COMM. OF EXPERTS ON TOBACCO INDUS. DOCUMENTS, WORLD HEALTH
ORG., TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES TO UNDERMINE TOBACCO CONTROL ACTIVITIES AT THE
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 47 (2000) [hereinafter TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES],
http://www.who.int/tobacco/en/who_inquiry.pdf [http://perma.cc/9WKS-5N3X]).
Id. at 241 (quoting TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES, supra note 99, at 48).
See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (offering proﬁt-oriented mission statements for
a number of organizations with consultative status).
See supra Section II.A.2 (reviewing business methods to create or make use of apparently public-interest NGOs to gain access to international organizations through consultative status).
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gimes to advocate for their corporate interests in international laws and policies.103 Both kinds of group—public-interest and private-sector—can play the
same two-level game, lobbying domestically and internationally to advance their
preferred legal rules.104
4. The Poverty of Access
Strong legitimacy optimism overstates the quality and quantity of access
consultant groups receive. Strong legitimacy optimism imagines a “participatory
revolution,”105 and a quantum of input by NGOs akin to representative voting.106 Moderate legitimacy optimism also envisions robust contributions to
lawmaking, capable of improving the input and output legitimacy of the ultimate rule.107 But, in many cases, the quantity of access nonstate actors enjoy, and
the amount of inﬂuence they wield, are much more impoverished than these
theories suggest. In particular, participatory rights are limited, NGOs are not
always allowed the full measure of access rights they are due,108 and formal consultative rights can provide minimal inﬂuence over the lawmaking process.109
What kinds of access and inﬂuence do the consultation rules afford? Formally three kinds: information rights, such as the capacity to receive press releases; rights to make written and—at times—oral comments; and opportunities
to lobby informally by accessing UN facilities and places where lawmakers and

103.
104.
105.

106.
107.
108.

109.

See supra Sections II.A.1, II.A.2 (reviewing the lobbying aims of associations that have received
accreditation at ECOSOC).
See generally Putnam, supra note 6 (theorizing that the negotiating behavior of national leaders
reﬂects the dual and simultaneous pressures of international and domestic political games).
Raustiala, supra note 22, at 537; see also Steven Bernstein, Legitimacy in Global Environmental
Governance, 1 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 139, 148 (2005) (noting the increased participation of
NGOs in international environmental organizations).
See discussion supra Section I.B.1.
See discussion supra Section I.B.1.
See Emanuele Rebasti, Beyond Consultative Status: Which Legal Framework for Enhanced Interaction Between NGOs and Intergovernmental Organizations?, in NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
EFFICIENCY IN FLEXIBILITY? 21, 32 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy & Luisa Vierucci eds., 2008).
See Inventory, supra note 83; see also Lars H. Gulbrandsen & Steinar Andresen, NGO Inﬂuence
in the Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol: Compliance, Flexibility Mechanisms, and Sinks, 4
GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 54, 59 (2004) (noting that many of the ﬁnal negotiations in treaty conference delegations are conducted behind closed doors, shutting out accredited NGOs).
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officials gather.110 But in surveys of NGO perceptions about the signiﬁcance of
their own access, NGOs have said that formal conferral of these rights is not a
sufficient means of facilitating their “participation” in international lawmaking
and governance.111
One problem is that the “patterns of interaction” with international organizations “depart[] signiﬁcantly from the one embodied in” the formal consultative relationship.112 Rather than facilitating increased “participation,” NGOs object that their interaction with lawmakers can be almost purely informal, with
the most signiﬁcant feature of consultative status being the right to an access
badge giving them access to “corridors, cafeteria and other sites at various UN
headquarters.”113 When it comes to large international treaty conferences where
NGOs show up in droves, groups can fare even worse. They are often relegated
to a large conference facility separate from the main negotiations and have little
effect on that process.114 Instead, much of the NGO inﬂuence takes place at the
domestic or transnational level prior to the negotiations, as NGOs lobby national
delegates to persuade them to adopt particular negotiating positions.115
The poverty of the access rules is again clariﬁed by a focus on business contributions. Offering trade and industry groups opportunities to submit substantive input during a rulemaking process can enhance the credibility of the ultimate
rule among that group’s constituents. Soliciting views can help build support for
the rule among national governments, which may otherwise be subject to lobbying efforts at the national level by disaffected private-sector groups.116 Finally,
allowing private groups access to the rulemaking process potentially can enhance
transparency by allowing those groups to disseminate information about that
lawmaking process to their members. For example, a private-sector association

110.

111.
112.
113.
114.

115.
116.

See Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 3 (outlining scope of consultation
opportunities at ECOSOC). See generally PETER WILLETTS, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN WORLD POLITICS: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 32-63 (2011) (reviewing different NGO modes of access to global policy-makers).
See Rebasti, supra note 108, at 31.
Id.
Id. at 32.
See Inventory, supra note 83; see also Gulbrandsen & Andresen, supra note 109, at 59 & n.13
(noting that NGOs had to rely mostly on “corridor politics” and “distribution of documents
during session breaks,” and referencing NGO-sponsored “side events”). See generally Rebasti,
supra note 111, at 31-37 (reviewing additional ways that the consultation rules inadequately
facilitate NGO participation).
See WILLETTS, supra note 110, at 154-61.
Durkee, supra note 63, at 78-81.
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was instrumental in developing the Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, a treaty that standardizes ﬁnancing for aircraft and
other mobile equipment and has been hailed as perhaps “the most signiﬁcant
piece of private international law in recent history.”117 In particular, the Aviation
Working Group, an association formed by market titans Airbus Industrie and
the Boeing Company, offered signiﬁcant feedback to UNIDROIT on the aircraft
manufacturing industry’s preferred ﬁnancing rules, and then later launched a
major campaign encouraging state governments to adopt the convention and offering states best practices for implementation.118
There is also established evidence that private-sector groups can enhance the
quality of information available to international organization decisionmakers, at
least in some contexts. Private-sector associations can offer expertise about what
legal standards might work in a given situation, what alternatives may be available, and what potential externalities may arise. For example, as the Cape Town
Convention was being developed, “[t]he Aviation Working Group assembled a
series of detailed drafts . . . which included extremely technical deﬁnitions of aircraft and aircraft engines”—information that would have only been available to
industry insiders.119 They also “proposed useful default remedies and priority
rules, and designed the international [online] registry” to record priority of interests.120 Another private-sector association, the International Air Transport Association (IATA), suggested an innovative treaty design approach that was ultimately adopted in the ﬁnal text.121 Finally, the Aviation Working Group was
successful at convincing governmental representatives to adopt a text that would
depart in some respects from legal cultural norms that diverged across civil and
common law jurisdictions.122 In short, commentators conclude that this privatesector association participation was “critically important,”123 and of “inestimable
value” to the ultimate success of the treaty.124

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Sandeep Gopalan, Harmonization of Commercial Law: Lessons from the Cape Town Convention
on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, 9 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 255, 255 (2003).
See Melissa J. Durkee, The Business of Treaties, 63 UCLA L. REV. 264, 294-96 (2016).
Id. at 295.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 295-96.
Roy Goode, From Acorn to Oak Tree: The Development of the Cape Town Convention and Protocols, 17 UNIFORM L. REV. 599, 606 (2012).
Id. at 603.
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Accruing all of these beneﬁts requires meaningful access to lawmakers, rather
than a consultation structure that facilitates a “medieval fair” sideshow purporting to be a participatory structure.125 Kenneth Abbott and David Gartner compare the consultation rules to what they see as truly participatory multistakeholder structures adopted by “a new generation of global health institutions.”126
Those structures—such as the GAVI Alliance and the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund)—“incorporat[e] civil society
representatives and other non-state actors directly into formal decision-making
bodies.”127 These actors, including “[NGOs], the private sector, private foundations, and other constituencies within civil society,” have seats on the board and
full voting capacity in the new institutions.128 Abbott and Gartner characterize
this structure as “direct participation” and contrast it with “mere consultative
process,” arguing that the former has a number of important advantages, including improving input and output legitimacy, enhancing the effectiveness of these
institutions, and grooming civil society leadership.129 They also recognize particular difficulties that could inhere to these multistakeholder structures, such as
inefficiency, but note that these problems have not arisen in the context of the
innovative public health structures on which their study focuses.130
While strong legitimacy optimism imagines global publics voting through
representative NGOs, the consultation structure offers something closer to unstructured lobbying access to those able to take advantage of it. The contrast between these forms of access and those of next generation multistakeholder institutions demonstrates the limitations of the former.
***
To summarize the insights of this Section, strong legitimacy optimism does
not accurately characterize either the diversity of actors who obtain access to international organizations or the quantum of access those nonstate participants
receive. The presence of business groups—acting in both overt and covert
ways—clariﬁes these descriptive failures. The suggestion is nuanced: while business input can be useful to the legitimacy and effectiveness of international organizations and the rules they produce, that input contributes to the input and
output legitimacy that moderate legitimacy optimists study. Its presence challenges the democratic assumptions of strong legitimacy optimism.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Inventory, supra note 83 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Abbott & Gartner, supra note 10, at 3-4.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 4, 5, 25-34.
Id. at 25.
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B. Practical Faults: Persistent Regulatory Defects
These failures of description correlate with failures in regulatory practice. To
summarize these regulatory failings—most of which have been previewed in the
prior discussion—the current system suffers from problems related to transparency, access, gatekeeping, administrability, and legitimacy.
Transparency. The fact that the consultancy rules exclude for-proﬁt entities
has resulted in the astroturf activism phenomenon, whereby businesses create or
co-opt nonproﬁt groups to serve as front groups to promote their causes within
international organizations.131 This creates a transparency problem, as the actors
driving the agendas of various organizations are obscured.
Access. The rules also create an access problem, as for-proﬁt actors cannot
consult directly but must aggregate their views through trade associations, create
astroturf NGOs, or co-opt existing groups to communicate on their behalves.132
Gatekeeping. The gatekeeping system is overburdened with the task of evaluating the suitability of numerous organizations for admission to the consultancy according to a complex set of rules that includes evaluations of NGOs’ internal governance structures, accountability to memberships, nonproﬁt
registration status, constitutional structure, and other factors.133 As a result, the
gatekeepers enforce the rules idiosyncratically, occasionally allowing access to
entities that should clearly be excluded (such as for-proﬁt entities), barring access to others for purely political reasons, and ﬂoundering under a persistent
backlog.134
Effectiveness. The consultation regime faces criticisms that the sheer number
of associations that are admitted results in a “medieval fair” sort of sideshow that
does not amount to meaningful consultation with international officials.135
Sometimes, as a result, accredited associations are not granted the forms of access to officials they believe they are formally due.136

131.

132.
133.
134.

135.
136.

See Durkee, supra note 14, at 229-44; cf. MACDONALD, supra note 57, at 2 (noting that “corporations have attempted to enhance their perceived public legitimacy by establishing ‘partnerships’ or ‘stakeholder dialogues’ with NGOs”).
See Durkee, supra note 14, at 229-44.
See id. at 247, 256-57.
See id. at 256-57; see also Rebasti, supra note 111, at 29-30 (noting gatekeeping problems, such
as when the 19-member committee charged with considering NGO applications to ECOSOC
often “appeared to be led more by political than by technical considerations”).
Inventory, supra note 83 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Rebasti, supra note 111, at 31-33 (noting a number of instances in which NGOs complained
that their access had been curbed).
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Legitimacy. The transparency, gatekeeping, and effectiveness problems lead
to legitimacy problems, as the system fails to deliver diverse perspectives and
meaningful engagement with nonstate actors.137 Moreover, in some circumstances, nonstate actors can have too much inﬂuence, even undue inﬂuence.138
Some nonstate actors use their access privileges to dominate the conversation in
a way that may harm the perceived legitimacy of a ﬁnal product.139
C. Why the Critique Matters
A business presence among those groups obtaining access to international
organizations complicates conventional accounts of the purpose and effects of
that access system, as we have seen. Identifying that site of business inﬂuence
also contributes to literatures on business roles in international governance, offers a new way of thinking about reforms to the access structures, and has the
potential to curb the development of a customary international legal rule that
confers greater international legal status to corporate entities.
1. Highlights an Underappreciated Site of Business Inﬂuence
This account contributes to literatures that analyze business roles in international lawmaking but have not yet focused on the consultation structures. That
literature has focused on rich description, ferreting out private-sector roles in
international rulemaking using a variety of theoretical lenses.
Liberal theory focuses on business as one of the interest groups that shape
nation-state preferences at the international level through domestic lobbying.140

137.

See Cardoso Report, supra note 4, at 16, 25 (proposing to “bring[] people from diverse backgrounds together to identify possible policy breakthroughs on emerging global priorities,”
and noting the growing inﬂuence of nonstate actors in multiconstituency partnerships); see
also Rebasti, supra note 111, at 33 (noting that, in practice, the consultation system “risks working to the disadvantage of the smallest, less resourced and less networked organizations and
thus, in general, of southern-based NGOs”).
138. See Durkee, supra note 14, at 229-44.
139. See Kelly, supra note 16.
140. See, e.g., Moravcsik, supra note 10 (elaborating liberal theory in international relations and
explaining that domestic constituencies construct state interests).
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Interest group lobbying might aim to secure domestic compliance with international legal rules,141 for example, or to harmonize rules in the various jurisdictions in which a business entity operates.142 Liberal theory has also inspired network theories which sometimes recognize the signiﬁcance of nonstate actor
networks operating transnationally to shape international law and policy.143
The global administrative law project has focused particular attention on
rulemaking144 through private or hybrid organizations like, for example, the International Standards Organization (ISO), which harmonizes product and process rules; the Fair Labor Association which sets standards for sports apparel;
and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a
once-private body that has come to include governmental representatives as
well.145 This literature observes that business entities self-regulate by engaging
in regulatory arbitrage, by setting up governance regimes in underregulated
spaces such as their own supply chains;146 by developing practices that develop
over time into “law that is just as real . . . [as] treaties”;147 or by creating private
standards that are later codiﬁed in treaty law.148

141.
142.
143.
144.

145.
146.

147.
148.

See Brewster, supra note 8; see also Benvenisti, supra note 8, at 170-84 (conceiving of the sovereign state as an agent of small interest groups).
See Shaffer, supra note 11, at 173.
See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 10 (conceptualizing this activity as transgovernmental networks).
See Kingsbury et al., supra note 10, at 18, 22-23; see also Karsten Nowrot, Transnational Corporations as Steering Subjects in International Economic Law: Two Competing Visions of the Future?,
18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 803, 803 (2011) (asserting that transnational corporations are
“political actors who are increasingly involved in the progressive development and enforcement of the regulatory structures of the international economic system,” speciﬁcally the World
Trade Organization and foreign investment regime).
Kingsbury et al., supra note 10, at 22-23.
Id.; see also Larry Catá Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board, and the Global Governance Order, 18 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 762-72 (2011) (noting that businesses self-regulate through regulatory arbitrage, and also self-regulate by creating rules for their supply chains); Kishanthi
Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L. REV. 747, 753-56 (2014) (noting that
corporations are increasingly responsible for regulating throughout their “global value
chains”).
Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade
Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125, 126 (2005).
See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 12, at 56-61 (describing the mechanism whereby the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures incorporates privately elaborated standards).
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Global legal pluralism and related accounts also focus on privately created
legal rules.149 For example, the new “lex mercatoria” is a global commercial law
shaped by nonstate actors and sometimes adopted into formal law by states or
international organizations.150 Businesses self-regulate through private codes of
conduct or trade association standards; sometimes these rules compete with,
prevent, or are absorbed by publicly created law.151 While the global legal pluralist account focuses on much of the same phenomena studied by global administrative law, the two accounts differ in approach. Global administrative law considers how the multiplicity of participants in international legal process can be
conceptualized as players in an administrative process, and how administrative
law safeguards like transparency, participation, review, and reason-giving can
enhance the legitimacy of that process. Global legal pluralism, by contrast, focuses on the hybrid, pluralist, and cosmopolitan nature of these overlapping
public and private regimes and suggests tools like conﬂict-of-law rules to mediate conﬂicts.
As for the topic of this Article’s analysis—business access to international organizations—there are some excellent topical accounts on which this analysis
builds. For example, there is a literature on “business and industry” NGOs, or
“BINGOs,”152 in the environmental arena, and especially with respect to climate

149.

See BERMAN, supra note 10, at 41-44 (discussing areas in which state and nonstate norms come
into conﬂict).
150. See, e.g., Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 447, 447 (2007) (asserting that the new lex mercatoria “freely combines elements from
national and non-national law”).
151. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 10 (outlining the relationships among private actors, intergovernmental organizations, and states and mapping them into a “governance triangle”).
152. See, e.g., Asher Alkoby, Global Networks and International Environmental Lawmaking: A Discourse Approach, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 377, 378 (2008) (using the term “BINGO” to refer to “business and industry nongovernmental organizations”); Chiara Giorgetti, From Rio to Kyoto: A
Study of the Involvement of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Negotiations on Climate
Change, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 201, 220 (1999) (noting that business NGOs were active lobbyists at a number of different climate change treaty negotiations).
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change.153 In addition, recent accounts by Susan Block-Lieb and Claire Kelly focus on industry and trade association participation at UNCITRAL.154 Other
scholars focus on business involvement in the new multistakeholder governance
structures.155 Thus, this account contributes to a growing literature on business
participation in various lawmaking and governance projects,156 highlighting an
important and understudied phenomenon in that realm.
2. Confronts a Reform Standstill
The access structure rules that ﬂow from the strong legitimacy optimist
frame have produced an array of regulatory failings. Proposed reforms that operate within this set of theoretical assumptions have not responded meaningfully
to those failures. Eschewing that conventional theory could create opportunities
for new regulatory solutions.
In particular, reform attempts have not been promising. Many of the reforms
proposed in the Cardoso Report, prepared in 2004 after a high-level study of the
ECOSOC consultation rules, were never adopted.157 Some international environmental organizations, once celebrated as examples of the success of consultation structures, have pulled back on allowing access to nonstate actors,158 but
these retractions are undertheorized. At UNCITRAL, France has lodged a series
of complaints about the consultation structure without successfully obtaining
any meaningful reform.159 Recently the WHO successfully instituted a new
“Framework of Engagement” for its interactions with nonstate actors.160 But the
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154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

This literature responds in part to the fact that the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has developed a set of accreditation rules that “differentiates
between research and independent NGOs (‘RINGOs’), business and industry NGOs (‘BINGOs’), environmental NGOs (‘ENGOs’), local NGOs, indigenous peoples organizations
(‘IPOs’), local government and municipal authorities (‘LGMAs’), islanders, trade unions, and
faith-based groups.” Stephen Tully, Commercial Contributions to the Climate Change Regime:
Who’s Regulating Whom?, 5 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 14, 16 (2005). Thus, in the environmental treaty literature, “BINGO” is a familiar term.
See SUSAN BLOCK-LIEB & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, GLOBAL LAWMAKERS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CRAFTING OF WORLD MARKETS (2017); Kelly, supra note 16.
See, e.g., Abbott & Gartner, supra note 10.
In a previous work, I began this project by looking at business participation through the accreditation structure at ECOSOC. Durkee, supra note 14.
See WILLETTS, supra note 110, at 59.
See Abbott & Gartner, supra note 10, at 3.
See Kelly, supra note 16.
WHO, Framework, supra note 16.

1779

the yale law journal

127:1742

2018

framework institutes a patchwork of ﬁxes that may not ultimately prove to be
any more administrable than the current ECOSOC structure.
Focusing particularly on the proposed WHO reform, the WHO Framework
erects a separate set of rules for “private-sector entities” and “international business associations” as distinct from “non-governmental organizations,” with additional safeguards in place for engagements with the private sector.161 The
Framework’s safeguards are meant to guard against “conﬂicts of interest” that
might have negative impacts on “WHO’s integrity, independence, credibility and
reputation; and public health mandate.”162 In this manner, the WHO Framework responds to concerns about conﬂicts of interest that may arise when nonstate actors, particularly those affiliated with economic, commercial, or ﬁnancial
interests, could unduly inﬂuence the WHO’s independence, objectivity, or professional judgment.163
But the Framework leaves to the WHO the task of discerning when an NGO
is, or is unduly inﬂuenced by, a “private sector entity.”164 What the reform misses
is that erecting categorical distinctions for the purpose of balancing representation or quashing conﬂicts of interest may send some business interests underground—reducing, rather than enhancing, transparency.165 Moreover, the reforms are likely to overburden already taxed gatekeepers, resulting in application
backlogs, incapacity to meaningfully screen applicant associations, and accidental admission of noncompliant groups. Strikingly, under the WHO Framework, officials are charged with independently assessing whether an association
may harbor any private-sector inﬂuences that could potentially cause undue inﬂuence over WHO officials and state delegates. This imposes a formidable burden on those institutional gatekeepers in an era where NGOs often have close
links and partnerships with the corporate world, and where business actors seek
all potential avenues to inﬂuence international law and policy.
Part of the reason for the lack of meaningful reforms to the ECOSOC and
other standard access structures may simply be path dependence. There is nothing predetermined about the current access structure. Rather, the structure appears to be principally the result of historical accident—the fact that the League

161.

Id. at Annex, ¶¶ 9-10.
Id. at Annex, ¶ 7(a), (c).
163. Id. at Annex, ¶ 22.
164. Id. at Annex, ¶ 13.
165. This critique was originally developed in Durkee, supra note 85, at 124, and draws substantially
on that account.
162.
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of Nations had a similar consultation practice—rather than principled theory.166
This is because the original Article 71 structure did not offer any signiﬁcant guidance for what form “consultation” was to take. Indeed, the legislative history of
the UN Charter appears to suggest that Article 71 was developed with very little
debate or discussion as a concession to the NGOs in San Francisco that pushed
for the provision.167 The spread of this same basic access structure throughout
much of the UN system seems to be similarly undertheorized.168
Thus, efforts to explain the access rules and consultation practice through
the conventional legitimacy optimist account are post-hoc rationalizations. They
do not ﬂow from the text, context, or intent of Article 71 of the UN Charter.169
Nothing about the ECOSOC access structure, or the structures that follow it, are
required by current international treaty law. Recognizing the shortcomings of
the conventional frame offers the potential to break reform logjams by adopting
another theory that might structure meaningful reforms.
3. Implicates Expressive Rights of International Business
Reforming private sector participation within the international access rules
has the potential to curb the development of a customary international legal rule
that would move business entities farther along the spectrum from “object” to
“subject” status under international law. That is, a reform could prevent the development of an international legal rule that grants additional legal standing under international law to business entities. For shorthand, the reader might analogize what is at stake here to the protection of certain legal personhood rights
for businesses in Citizens United in the United States.170 The argument is not
immediately obvious, but it has signiﬁcant implications.

166.
167.
168.

169.

170.

Charnovitz, supra note 22, at 258 (explaining that Article 71 served to “codify the custom of
NGO participation” that had existed in the League of Nations period prior to World War II).
Id. at 249-50.
See Charnovitz, supra note 13, at 358 (“Even though Article 71 refers only to ECOSOC, a consultative role for NGOs gradually became an established practice throughout the UN system.”); see also Abbott & Gartner, supra note 10, at 4 (discussing the spread of the Article 71
access structure); Durkee, supra note 14, at 223-34 (discussing the signiﬁcance of Article 71).
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31-32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (offering text, context, and intent as sources of authority for
treaty interpretation).
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340-41 (2010) (holding 5-4 that the First Amendment
prohibits the government from restricting independent political expenditures by corporate
entities).
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In addition to the debate about whether or not NGOs contribute to the legitimacy or democratic accountability of international organizations, a second
question has attracted a fair amount of attention. That is, have nonstate actors
obtained rights to consult with nonstate organizations? And do international organizations have a duty to receive international consultation?171 The majority position maintains that NGOs have no consultation rights or special status as subjects of international law.172 A minority position, however, maintains that NGOs
do have a right to consult, or that international organizations have a duty to receive NGO consultation.173
The minority argument is as follows: International customary law is developed through the consistent practice of states, accompanied by a sense of legal
obligation to maintain that practice.174 International organizations operate under authority delegated from states and so have some degree of delegated lawmaking authority.175 Because a variety of international institutions have maintained the practice of offering consultation rights to NGOs over the past century,
and because there is some evidence that these institutions believe these consultation structures to be obligatory, international customary law may be currently
evolving to require that international organizations continue to offer those access
rights.176
This unresolved debate raises the stakes for anyone seeking to design or reform international consultation rules. If these regulatory practices can harden
over time to become binding law that governs international organizations and
the nation-state delegates that operate within them—law from which those actors cannot legally deviate—then the features of those regulatory practices take
on an added signiﬁcance.177 Lawmakers should take care to ensure that they
171.
172.
173.
174.

175.

176.
177.

See Charnovitz, supra note 58, at 909 (suggesting that “state practice is moving toward a duty
to consult NGOs in the activities of [international organizations]”).
See id.
See id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2)
(AM. LAW INST. 1987) (deﬁning international custom as “a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation”).
See ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS, supra note 10, at 15 (international organizations “are institutions of limited and delegated powers”); id. at 17-45 (exploring
theories that interrogate, inter alia, the nature and scope of these delegated powers); cf. ALVAREZ, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 10,
at 18-45 (challenging the positivist conception that the activity of international organizations
is limited to explicit delegations of authority from states).
See Charnovitz, supra note 58, at 909.
Even if access rules diverge to some extent across international organizations, common features of those rules could conceivably become binding law.
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maintain access rules and practices that best serve desired institutional and public goods.
That signiﬁcance is particularly acute in the case of business entities. If
NGOs have acquired, or are in the midst of acquiring, access rights to international institutions, then these rights must extend equally to trade and industry
associations. This is because customary international law rules are based on practice, and there is no practice-based distinction between public-interest associations and proﬁt-promoting trade and industry associations.178 To the extent that
international organizations hold a duty to consult with NGOs, the same principles apply to both kinds of associations, and international organizations can
make no meaningful distinction between kinds of entity. The current practice
would appear to pave the way for a set of legally mandated access rights for
proﬁt-promoting associations, much in the same way as business entities in the
United States have constitutionally protected speech rights.179
***
This Part has attempted to show that strong legitimacy optimism—which
imagines the international access rules as producing a “global people-power”180
that confers excess legitimacy on international organizations—fails as an explanatory theory. Among other shortcomings, it has not grappled with the reality and
signiﬁcance of the global business lobby. Moreover, strong legitimacy optimism
has been unsuccessful as a normative principle, producing unadministrable rules
that underregulate, overregulate, or arbitrarily regulate access.
At the same time, existing literature on business contributions to lawmaking
has engaged in investigative description, seeking to ferret out businesses’ lawmaking methods and motivations. However, the literature has underexplored a
traditional form of business activity (lobbying) taking place in a non-traditional
place (international institutions). Thus, literatures regarding corporate accountability, social responsibility, undue inﬂuence, and lobbying have not yet addressed the international access rules. Those access rules have suffered as a result

178.

See discussion supra Section II.A.1.
179. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339-40 (2010) (holding that the First Amendment
confers on corporations the right to express themselves by unlimited spending on political
speech).
180. Press Release, Secretary-General, Partnership with Civil Society Necessity in Addressing
Global Agenda, Says Secretary-General in Wellington, New Zealand Remarks, U.N. Press
Release SG/SM/7318 (Feb. 29, 2000) (remarks by Secretary-General Koﬁ Annan), http://
www.un.org/press/en/2000/20000229.sgsm7318.doc.html [http://perma.cc/Q4TY
-WSWS].
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of the blind spot at the intersection of these two literatures. They are now characterized by problems relating to access, transparency, administrability, gatekeeping, and legitimacy.
Moderate legitimacy optimism holds more promise as both an explanatory
and a normative theory. After all, even if strong legitimacy optimism is susceptible to the criticisms of this Part, the Article embraces the idea that access and
participation in rulemaking by nonstate actors can contribute to the legitimacy
or effectiveness of an organization’s ultimate rules. However, moderate legitimacy optimism likely overstates the legitimacy effects of the current access rules
and suffers from indeterminacy as a principle of reform. The challenge is to build
reforms on accurate facts and to transform an indeterminate theory into a functional guide for action. How exactly should access to international organizations
be regulated? This is the task of the next Part.
iii. a theory of international lobbying law
The international access rules should be understood as a body of lobbying
law. The frame offers both a new analytical framework and positive law payoffs.
Descriptively, it more accurately describes the access to international officials that
these rules provide and the actors to which these rules offer access. Conceiving of
the accreditation rules as lobbying rules focuses regulators on the salient features
of these rules and identiﬁes a useful set of regulatory tools. These tools are imported from U.S. domestic law lobbying strategies, international guidelines, and
the experience of other jurisdictions like the EU. They particularly focus on registration and disclosure.
The lobbying model responds to pressures on the international access system
described in the prior Part and evidenced by the variety of reform proposals at
ECOSOC, the WHO, and UNCITRAL.181 It also shows the limits of current
opportunities for nonstate input in lawmaking, thereby clearing the way for reforms that would offer more robust kinds of participation, such as incorporating
nonstate actors as full voting members of multistakeholder organizations. Thus,
reframing the access rules—or “consultation” structure in the ECOSOC nomenclature—as international lobbying law cuts through stagnant conversations
about legitimacy to better explain the function of the current access rules and
update outdated, path-dependant structures to meet the demands of twentyﬁrst century facts.

181.

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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A. The Lobbying Framework Offers a Helpful Descriptive Analogy
Describing the international access rules as a body of international lobbying
law offers a more faithful characterization of the facts than descriptions that
paint these rules as a nonstate actor “consultation” regime, or a structure that
invites nonstate actor participation in governance. As foreshadowed in Section
II.A., the lobbying framework more accurately describes the limited access to international officials that these rules provide. This is not a voting structure, where
accreditation would offer nonstate actors full participation in the lawmaking
process. Rather, it offers them many informal points of access to lawmakers
through UN grounds passes as well as opportunities to submit written comments and, at times, to raise agenda items or make statements from the ﬂoor.182
Nonstate actors themselves claim that the most important feature of the consultation rules is the “informal dimension,” or access to “corridors, cafeteria and
other sites,” where they may lobby governmental delegations and other officials.183 In short, the access opportunities principally include access for purposes
of informal lobbying, and groups can make of this what they will.184
The lobbying frame also more accurately describes the kinds of actors that
are granted access. These actors are not only representatives of public interest
groups who are working to advance a concept of the public good.185 Rather, they
are also private sector groups like trade and industry associations whose traditional purposes include lobbying domestic lawmakers.186 In addition, as the legitimacy pessimists have long asserted, the actors with access often inadequately
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184.
185.
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See Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 3 (outlining the scope of consultation opportunities at ECOSOC). See generally WILLETTS, supra note 110, at 32-63 (outlining
different NGO modes of access to global policy makers).
Rebasti, supra note 111, at 32 (noting also that “[t]he gap between the actual means of action
(lobbying) and the legal framework of the NGO-IGO [international governmental organization] relationship is made clear by the cases in which, despite the formal respect for their legal
status, advocacy NGOs are prevented from having direct access to governmental delegations,”
which NGOs see as “crucial to the advocacy role”).
See WILLETTS, supra note 110, at 61-63.
Cf. Anderson, supra note 50, at 32 (noting that the established assumption that NGOs advance
“leftwing” values is undermined by growing international prominence of industry groups like
the National Riﬂe Association).
See Sarah Dadush, Industry Associations, Governance & Chocolate 1 (Feb. 1, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with author) (“The most common stories about industry associations and governance focus on domestic regulatory capture.”); see also supra Sections
II.A.1, II.A.2 (reviewing the lobbying aims of associations that have received accreditation at
ECOSOC).
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represent the persons or interests they purport to promote,187 and some are inﬂuenced, or covertly co-opted, by other interest groups.188
Moreover, to eschew the lobbying framework and embrace strong legitimacy
optimism introduces a potentially unintended consequence, as described in Section II.C.3. That is, to imagine that nonstate actors are conferring democratic
legitimacy through the consultation system by representing the interests of a
broader civilian constituency is to recognize private sector groups as relevant civilian constituencies.189 Because status follows practice in international law,
those private sector groups necessarily take their place among the “global publics” entitled to access to international officials.190 Thus, description matters: the
strong legitimacy optimist account potentially extends expressive rights to international business, while the lobbying frame does not.191
Finally, consider another potential analogy for nonstate actor access to international lawmakers: the notice-and-comment procedure in U.S. administrative
law under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Of these two regulatory
analogies, lobbying better captures the freer-form features of the nonstate actor
access structure. In a notice-and-comment procedure, actors offer comments
within a structured process and then regulators are required to respond. In the
international access structures, nonstate actors have opportunities to make comments, but also to lobby on a more informal basis, and there is no response requirement. Granted, contemporary administrative legal scholarship notes that a
great deal of informal lobbying behavior also takes place outside of the formalized notice-and-comment process.192 However, the notice-and-comment procedure still reﬂects top-down attempts by administrative agencies to promulgate
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See Anderson, supra note 13, at 873-77 & n.98 (noting that after the so-called Battle in Seattle
protests against the World Trade Organization in 1999, UN officials began to appreciate the
fact that NGOs’ interests do not always align with UN interests; they then began to adopt
critiques of NGO representativeness and discovered that some NGOs were simply “three people and a fax” (quoting Justin Marozzi, Whose World Is It, Anyway?, SPECTATOR (Aug. 5,
2000), at 15, who interviewed Fareed Zakaria, then Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs)).
See Durkee, supra note 14, at 238-43.
See supra Section II.C.3 for a more complete analysis of this point.
Press Release, supra note 180.
See supra Section II.C.3.
Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission
Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 102 (2011) (“[I]n practice, notice-and-comment rulemaking
may only be the tip of the iceberg in providing avenues for interest groups to inform agencies’
rulemaking projects.”). See generally William F. West, Inside the Black Box: The Development of
Proposed Rules and the Limits of Procedural Controls, 41 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 576 (2009) (studying
“prenotice participation”—which takes place before the official notice-and-comment period—
by business and other interest groups).
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particular rules, while the lobbying analogy captures the open-textured nature
of relationships between lobbying groups and law- and policy-makers, to the
point where outside groups may even—at times—drive the agenda of the organization they lobby. Moreover, a lobbying frame focuses reformers on salient features of the access structures, as follows.
B. The Lobbying Framework Invites Meaningful Reforms
In offering a helpful descriptive analogy, the lobbying framework also lays
groundwork for meaningful reforms.
The lobbying framework helps vindicate the agenda of the moderate legitimacy optimists, who argue that input by outside groups has a number of substance and process beneﬁts and can often be quite helpful to lawmaking projects.193 The lobbying frame does not suggest that those contributions by outside
actors should be eliminated, but that existing theory and practice is mismatched:
access to officials and lawmakers through the accreditation regimes is mistaken
for participation in the work of international organizations, with corresponding
legitimating and democratizing beneﬁts. Moreover, this participation is imagined to principally involve public interest organizations, rather than paid lobbyists. Both of these ﬂawed premises lead to ﬂawed regulations that both over- and
under-restrict access to nonstate actors. The regulations neither offer the meaningful quantum of participation that would allow nonstate actors to offer the
substance and process goods the moderate legitimacy optimists imagine, nor do
they adequately restrain against harms like undue inﬂuence and capture.
Recognizing those ﬂaws allows reformers to choose between two more reasonable options: regulating a pluralistic access regime like a lobbying regime,
with regulation focusing on registration and disclosure; or creating multistakeholder structures that embrace more robust participation by nonstate actors.194
This argument builds on the work of those who advocate for enhanced multistakeholder structures,195 observe the beneﬁts of global legal pluralism, or seek
greater opportunities for business participation in law production.196 For exam-
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See, e.g., Durkee, supra note 118, at 291-97 (describing business roles in ensuring the success
of the Cape Town Convention); Goode, supra note 123, at 606 (same); see also supra notes 1011 and accompanying text (describing recent literature on the role of nonstate actors in the
development of international law).
194. See, e.g., Abbott & Gartner, supra note 10, at 1-5, 25-35.
195. Id. at 4.
196. Id.
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ple, Abbott and Gartner argue that nonstate actor participation in multistakeholder structures can contribute to an institution’s credibility and ensure deliberative values like transparency, reason-giving, and consideration of a broader
range of interests,197 without sacriﬁcing effective performance.198
By contrast, many of the current access structures, including the ECOSOC
structure, do not allow outside actors to engage in robust multistakeholder participation in the production of law or policy. Rather, the access rules at ECOSOC
and elsewhere maintain the primacy of states, preserving the classic hierarchy of
state sovereignty and nonstate subordination. Characterizing these policies as
lobbying rules clariﬁes that fundamental hierarchical relationship. The implications are instructive: if international officials and nation-state delegates seek to
incorporate nonstate actor input in deeper ways, they must craft new regulatory
structures to accomplish those goals. Otherwise, they can borrow from the
toolbox of national-level lobbying regulations and guidelines to craft a more administrable international lobbying regime.
C. The Lobbying Framework Identiﬁes Pertinent Regulatory Tools
The lobbying framework identiﬁes regulatory models for potential international reforms. In particular, model regulations offered by the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and watchdog groups, as
well as lobbying regulations in the United States, focus on transparency and
meaningful disclosure as the best regulatory response to lobbying activity. This
discussion will begin with an examination of those models, and then turn to an
explanation of some of the nuances and tensions in U.S. lobbying law that must
be taken into account in any use of the U.S. model as a guiding frame.
1. International Guidelines on Lobbying Regulation
Guidelines issued by the OECD and democracy watchdog groups may serve
as useful regulatory analogies for the international stage.
International guidelines have been developed out of a perception that lobbying is underregulated in national jurisdictions. According to a 2016 report by the
Sunlight Foundation, a U.S. nonproﬁt focused on open government, only
twenty countries other than the United States regulate lobbying.199 For obvious
197.

Id. passim.
198. Id. at 32.
199. Libby Watson, Inﬂuence Abroad: The State of Global Lobbying Disclosure, SUNLIGHT FOUND.
(Nov. 30, 2016, 3:34 PM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/2016/11/30/inﬂuence-abroad-the
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reasons, this list skews toward democracies, and the list includes just a smattering of countries from each continent: the United Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland,
Lithuania, Georgia, Israel, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Australia, and
Taiwan.200 The European Union itself also regulates lobbying, although only a
few of its constituent states have domestic lobbying regulations.201 Remarkably,
then, only ten percent of the world’s countries regulate lobbying. A 2013 report
by the OECD conﬁrmed this dearth of lobbying regulation worldwide, stating
that of the OECD’s thirty-ﬁve mostly economically advanced member countries,
only twelve had “approved legislation and government regulations” regarding
lobbying as of 2013, and some of the countries appearing on that list required
only voluntary reporting.202
Since national lobbying regulation on the whole appears to be underdeveloped, there is a push by the OECD and nonproﬁts like the Sunlight Foundation
to encourage more countries to adopt robust lobbying regulations, especially because businesses now lobby transnationally. The OECD, for example, elaborated
a set of guidelines recognizing that one of the obstacles that typically prevents
countries from further regulating lobbying is the “complexity and sensitive nature” of lobbying regulations, and that most existing reforms have developed
responsively, in the wake of political scandals.203 At the same time, the OECD’s
surveys of both lobbyists and legislators in OECD member countries show that
both parties prefer disclosures in order to “alleviate actual or perceived problems
of inappropriate inﬂuence peddling by lobbyists.”204 To this end, “the OECD re-

-state-of-global-lobbying-disclosure [http://perma.cc/T44U-QNTS]. The Sunlight Foundation, which bills itself as a nonpartisan nonproﬁt that advocates globally for open government, has undertaken extensive research on international lobbying laws. The group
was founded by Michael Klein, a former partner at WilmerHale, and its advisory board includes Harvard’s Lawrence Lessig and Yochai Benkler among others. Board & Advisors,
SUNLIGHT FOUND. (2017), http://sunlightfoundation.com/about/board [http://perma.cc
/75GP-W8HN]. The group also notably includes Wikipedia founder Jimmy Wales and Craig
Newmark of Craigslist.
200. Watson, supra note 199.
201. See id.
202. Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 2 (2013), http://
www.oecd.org/corruption/ethics/Lobbying-Brochure.pdf [http://perma.cc/792P-NNSP]
(listing Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Mexico, Poland, Slovenia, the
United States, and, most recently, Austria and the Netherlands as the only countries with
lobbying regulations).
203. Id.
204. Id.
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viewed data and experiences of government regulation, legislation and self-regulation of lobbyists” as well as “comparative reviews, country case studies and
an analytical framework endorsed by governments” in order to develop “10 Principles” of effective lobbying regulation, which it issued in 2009.205
According to the OECD’s ﬁndings, effective lobbying regulation includes (a)
unambiguous deﬁnitions of lobbyists and lobbying activities; (b) required disclosure about the objectives, beneﬁciaries, funding sources, and targets of lobbing activity; (c) rules regarding use of conﬁdential information, conﬂicts of interest, and revolving-door incentives; (d) monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms; and (e) “a culture of integrity and transparency in daily practice
through regular disclosure and auditing to ensure compliance.”206
The OECD emphasizes that public officials should beneﬁt from the free ﬂow
of information and allow all stakeholders, from the private sector to the public
at large, fair and equitable access.207 It also presses for a clear deﬁnition of lobbying, and focuses on the importance of disclosures by lobbyists and a “publicly
available register” where the public and all potential stakeholders (“including
civil society organisations, businesses, the media and the general public”) can
access lobbying disclosures and scrutinize lobbying activities.208 Additionally,
the OECD emphasizes the importance of clear behavioral standards for lobbyists
and officials alike with respect to revolving-door opportunities and the use of
conﬁdential information.209 The OECD does not offer a model law for lobbying
regulation, but instead stresses the importance of home-grown legal solutions.
A group of civil society organizations including Transparency International
and the Sunlight Foundation also put together their own guidelines for lobbying
regulation in 2015, attempting to build on prior efforts by the OECD and existing
regulations in national jurisdictions.210 These guidelines closely align with the
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Id. at 1.
Id.
207. Id. at 3 (“Public officials should preserve the beneﬁts of the free ﬂow of information and facilitate public engagement.”).
208. Id. at 4.
209. Id. (“In particular, they should cast no doubt on their impartiality to promote the public interest, share only authorised information and not misuse ‘conﬁdential information,’ disclose
relevant private interests and avoid conﬂict of interest . . . . Countries should consider establishing restrictions for public officials leaving office . . . .”).
210. International Standards for Lobbying Regulation: Towards Greater Transparency, Integrity
and Participation, TRANSPARENCY INT’L 3 (2015), http://lobbyingtransparency.net
/lobbyingtransparency.pdf [http://perma.cc/54PY-SQU9].
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OECD recommendations in that they emphasize the transparency of the decision-making process through robust disclosure in a lobbying register,211 public
access to the information,212 and adequate enforcement and sanctions.213 Like
the OECD effort, the civil society effort also focused on clear codes of conduct
for lobbyists and public officials.214 The civil society guidelines also recommended open access to officials in order to achieve more balanced representation
by a diversity of interests.215 However, the guidelines merely emphasized “open
and fair access” and contained few concrete suggestions about how to achieve
representational balance.216 Finally, like the OECD effort, the civil society guidelines refrained from offering model regulations, ostensibly to encourage regulators to “address the particularities of the local context.”217
Thus, lobbying regulations are underdeveloped outside of the United States,
and reform efforts seek to protect open access and promote transparency. However, reformers have stopped short of providing model regulations that could
serve as reference points for international lobbying regulations.
2. U.S. Lobbying Law
U.S. lobbying regulations are signiﬁcantly more robust than lobbying regulations in much of the rest of the world, and so may serve as the most meaningful
regulatory framework to guide international reforms.218 According to the Sunlight Foundation report, the U.S. stands out in that it clearly deﬁnes lobbyists
and lobbying activity, requires extensive disclosures, and then publishes those
disclosures “in a searchable, sortable, exportable database on the Senate’s website.”219 By contrast, only ﬁfteen other countries offer any online data about lobbying activity, and many fewer host a searchable database.220 While the United
Kingdom appears to have a rigorous lobbying disclosure regime, it deﬁnes lobbying so narrowly as to capture only a fraction of potential lobbying activity in
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 13.
This is the case even though lobbying activity has recently dramatically increased in countries
such as England, Canada, and Australia. Cohen-Eliya & Hammer, supra note 71, at 268.
Watson, supra note 199.
Id. (noting that only six countries besides the United States host a searchable database).
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those disclosures221—perhaps three percent.222 Because of the comparative robustness of the U.S. model, the following discussion will examine the U.S. approach in some detail.
Regulatory tools used in the United States principally include sunlight rules
requiring disclosures and registration.223 The 1946 Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act initially “imposed registration requirements for those who lobbied
Congress, as well as a requirement of quarterly reports of money spent and received for lobbying activities.”224 Forty years later, Congress passed the U.S. Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA),225 which improved on the 1946 Act by expanding
the scope of disclosure for lobbying activity, the list of who must register as a
lobbyist, and what information must be disclosed.226 Yet the LDA faced criticism
for being inaccessible and indecipherable to average citizens.227 Thus, Congress
amended it in 2007 to further strengthen disclosure requirements and, signiﬁcantly, to make data available for online searching.228 Also in 2007, inspired by
the Jack Abramoff scandal, Congress passed the Honest Leadership and Open
Government Act (HLOGA),229 which, among other things, “expanded disclosure of lobbying coalitions,” introduced “a new reporting system for lobbyist
contributions and disbursements,” and “improved public access to information
disclosed under the LDA.”230
In addition to the general registration and disclosure-based lobbying laws,
the U.S. Congress has also sought to address undue inﬂuence and bribery. For

221.
222.
223.

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id.
In an article surveying the ﬁeld just after the Citizens United decision, Richard Hasen compiled
a useful history of lobbying regulation. Hasen, supra note 2, at 200-08. Hasen drew from
William V. Luneburg et al.’s co-edited volume, The Lobbying Manual. See THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 1.
Hasen, supra note 2, at 201.
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (codiﬁed as amended at 2
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1614 (2012)); Hasen, supra note 2, at 201-02.
Hasen, supra note 2, at 202.
Id. (citing Anita S. Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest-Group-Based, Approach to
Lobbying Regulation, 58 ALA. L. REV. 513, 520 (2007)).
Id. at 202-03.
Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (HLOGA), Pub. L. No. 110-81, 121
Stat. 735 (codiﬁed in scattered sections of 2 and 18 U.S.C.).
Thomas M. Susman & William V. Luneburg, History of Lobbying Disclosure Reform Proposals
Since 1955, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 1, at 37.
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example, the HLOGA attempted to reduce revolving-door pressures by extending the waiting period for senators to work as lobbyists,231 “required reports on
lobbyists’ ‘bundling’ of campaign contributions,” and “banned gifts from lobbyists to members of Congress and staffers.”232 Finally, Congress sought to ensure that lobbyists do not receive extra federal subsidies for engaging in lobbying
activity by denying business income tax deductions for lobbying expenses and
limiting lobbing activity by 501(c)(3) organizations.233
Individual U.S. states have developed lobbying rules that share features with
the federal system, though particular state rules vary widely.234 States have employed strategies such as banning campaign contributions or fundraising activities, banning contingency fee lobbying, or imposing provisions to prohibit revolving-door incentives.235 In addition, most states have lobbyist disclosure and
registration requirements.236
While the basis for lobbying rights in the United States is contested,237 the
U.S. Supreme Court has addressed challenges to disclosure and tax laws with a
First Amendment free speech analysis.238 It upheld the 1946 Act on the ground
that legislators should be able to properly evaluate the “myriad pressures to
which they are regularly subjected.”239 Thus, the Court “held that the state’s in-

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

236.

237.

238.
239.

Id. at 205.
Id.
Id. at 203.
Trevor D. Dryer, Gaining Access: A State Lobbying Case Study, 23 J.L. & POL. 283, 285-86 (2007);
id. at 293 n.28 (listing state lobbying laws).
See id. at 285-86, 293; Ethics: Contingency Fees for Lobbyists, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-chart-contingency-fees.aspx [http://perma
.cc/P86Z-V94Q].
Andrew P. Thomas, Easing the Pressure on Pressure Groups: Toward a Constitutional Right To
Lobby, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 176 (1993) (“Forty-six states have mandated both registration and disclosure requirements for lobbyists, and one requires only registration.”).
There is a debate within the United States about whether there is a constitutional right to
lobby, but courts and scholars mostly agree that such a right is guaranteed by the First Amendment’s Petition Clause. The Clause enshrines a citizen’s right to petition the government, and
there is broad agreement that this extends to lobbying activity. This view, while embraced by
courts, including the Supreme Court, is nevertheless contested. Recently, Maggie McKinley
compiled a history of the Petition Clause in order to defend an argument that the Petition
Clause protects a narrower set of activities than the “bundle” of practices regulated under federal lobbying laws. See McKinley, supra note 2.
Hasen, supra note 2, at 209-12.
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954).
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terest in providing information to legislators justiﬁed the disclosure requirements.”240 The Supreme Court has also noted the need for public conﬁdence in
legislative integrity, noting that “[t]he activities of lobbyists who have direct access to elected representatives, if undisclosed, may well present the appearance
of corruption.”241 This latter justiﬁcation accords with rationales offered by Congress in the legislative history of the LDA.242
The U.S. lobbying framework is subject to a number of critiques. One addresses the sufficiency of disclosure as a means of regulation, which requires sufﬁciently motivated watchdog groups to monitor the disclosures. Another notes
the opaqueness of the lobbying process to outsiders.243 Moshe Cohen-Eliya and
Yoav Hammer suggest remedying transparency failures and reducing monitoring costs by drastically increasing required disclosures: for example by requiring
lobbyists to publish online all written material transmitted to politicians and to
list all areas of lobbying activity.244 Others suggest that the principal problem is
unevenness in the lobbying capabilities of private-sector and public-interest
groups. Reformers have proposed public funding to subsidize “lobbyists that
represent diffuse, non-corporate interests,”245 as a means of “leveling up” or
evening the playing ﬁeld.246 Maggie McKinley has proposed a reform of a First

240.
241.

242.

243.
244.
245.

246.

Hasen, supra note 2, at 209.
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 356 n.20 (1995); see also Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 369 (2010) (“[T]he Court has upheld registration and disclosure requirements on lobbyists, even though Congress has no power to ban lobbying itself.”).
The legislative history of the LDA focuses on “public awareness of lobbyist activities and public conﬁdence,” Hasen, supra note 2, at 210, noting that “effective public disclosure of the identity and extent of the efforts of paid lobbyists to inﬂuence federal officials in the conduct of
Government actions will increase public conﬁdence in the integrity of Government,” id. (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 1601(3) (2012)). These disclosure procedures are thus drawn from similar rationales as offered in campaign ﬁnance disclosure cases, which rest on principles of anticorruption, appearance of corruption, and information interests. Elizabeth Garrett et al.,
Constitutional Issues Raised by the Lobbying Disclosure Act, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note
1, at 197, 201.
See McKinley, supra note 2.
Cohen-Eliya & Hammer, supra note 71, at 267.
Dorie Appollonio et al., Access and Lobbying: Looking Beyond the Corruption Paradigm, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 48 (2008); see also Heather Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the
New Campaign Finance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1155, 1165-67 (2011) (making a similar claim).
Gerken, supra note 245, at 1166, 1168; Gerken & Tausanovitch, supra note 2, at 86-90; Hasen,
supra note 2, at 208 (referencing Gerken for the idea of “leveling up”); see also Heidi Li Feldman, Toward an Ethics of Being Lobbied: Affirmative Obligations To Listen, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 493, 493 (2014) (asserting the ethical principle that “those in political office have afﬁrmative obligations to seek out and listen to the widest and most diverse possible range of
people” affected by a given regulation).
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Amendment Petition Clause practice that has now fallen into desuetude, consisting of clear rules and procedures by which members of the public can petition
Congress.247 This ﬁx could entail something akin to a congressional Administrative Procedure Act248 including “formal guidelines to make transparent and predictable the consideration [Congress] will afford” to petitions, and the requirement that all “lobbying” follow this formalized procedure.249 McKinley claims
this would “allow professionalization of the representatives who represent the
public in the formal petition process,”250 beneﬁt those clients pursuing public
interests, and reduce the current “viliﬁ[cation]” of professional lobbyists.251 A
number of scholars propose campaign ﬁnance reform to bolster current lobbying
disclosure laws and curb potential undue inﬂuence. Reform proposals have suggested additional bans on lobbyist fundraising or contributions to congressional
election campaigns to avoid quid pro quo or “pay to play” arrangements.252 Finally, other reformers have targeted enforcement deﬁcits. The Sunlight Foundation points to a large number of unregistered lobbyists and a lack of response by
the Department of Justice.253
Thus, U.S. lobbying rules are susceptible to an array of critiques. However,
there is nevertheless evidence that the United States’ basic registration-plus-disclosure model represents global best practice at this time. The OECD’s and the
Sunlight Foundation’s recommendations advocate for this approach, and most
jurisdictions surveyed in the Sunlight Foundation study follow at least some of
its basic elements. For example, due to the absence of domestic lobbying regulations in EU member countries, the EU’s lobbying regulations took U.S. lobbying
regulations as a guide. Over time, the EU lobbying framework has moved even
closer to the U.S. approach by focusing particularly on transparency, open government, and accountability.254 One commentator notes that the two regulatory

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

McKinley, supra note 2, at 1199-1200.
Id. at 1199.
Id. at 1200.
Id. at 1201.
Id.
Hasen, supra note 2, at 208.
Watson, supra note 199 (observing that “there are thousands of people in D.C. who are paid
to inﬂuence public policy, but don’t register as lobbyists”).
Liliana Mihut, Lobbying in the United States and the European Union: New Developments in Lobbying Regulation, 8 ROMANIAN J. EUR. AFF. 5, 14 (2008).
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structures “have sprung from similar problems, and therefore have targeted similar goals, in a world where globalization has diffused lobbying practices.”255 The
European Commission’s speciﬁc strategy consists of a voluntary register for interest representatives together with a binding code of conduct,256 while the European Parliament instituted a mandatory register with full ﬁnancial disclosure.257
In conclusion, a reformer may query whether, in light of critiques of the registration-plus-disclosure model, those strategies should become a model for reforms at international organizations. However, these criticisms appear to point
more to the challenge inherent in regulating lobbying activity than to the particular shortcomings of this regulatory approach.
3. Applying the Lobbying Regulatory Analogy
Lobbying regulation in the U.S.—as an example of global best practice—is
relevant to regulation of international lobbying activity by identifying the following principles.
First, the principal regulatory tools to address lobbying activity are the registration of lobbyists and the disclosure of lobbying activity. The rationale for
these regulatory strategies is not well established in the United States, but proposed explanations include: (a) protection of the legislator’s capacity to evaluate
the nature and origin of the pressures to which they are subjected; and (b) protection of the public’s conﬁdence in legislative integrity and reduction of the appearance of corruption. Both of these public interests are balanced in the United
States against First Amendment free speech rights (and potentially First Amendment Petition Clause rights), so lobbying cannot be entirely restricted. Moreover, banning lobbying may impinge on the public interest in gathering the views
of constituents and the expertise of experts.
The U.S. approach does not select particular kinds of groups for lobbying
activity as do the international access rules. U.S. tax rules that prohibit 501(c)(3)
charitable organizations from participating in lobbying activity do not separate
for-proﬁt from non-proﬁt organizations in the way that the international system
does. Rather, the U.S. tax system makes this distinction in order to even the
playing ﬁeld by regulating all entrants equally. The purpose of the tax rule is to
255.

Id. Nevertheless, some differences in approach remain. Europe retains corporatist traditions
where unions, employer associations, and public officials engage in dialogue, resulting in a
less robust tradition of lobbying and less stringent regulatory requirements. See id.
256. Id. There is a particular inducement for representatives to register: those who do are alerted
to opportunities to comment on speciﬁc areas of interest. Id.
257. Id. One of the EU leaders responsible for launching and implementing the EU register focused
speciﬁcally on the similarities between the EU regulations and those of the United States. Id.
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ensure that tax-exempt organizations do not receive a subsidy for participating
in lobbying activities. In short, the U.S. approach focuses on individual rights to
lobby, beneﬁts accruing to lawmakers when they hear from the public, and the
transparency of that process.
Many elements of the U.S. domestic lobbying model apply well in the international context. Speciﬁcally, international lobbying regulations should focus on
protecting a lawmaker’s capacity to evaluate the nature and origin of the pressures to which they are subjected, protecting the public’s conﬁdence in the lawmaking process, and allowing third-party watchdog groups to monitor lobbying
activity and bring it to the attention of relevant lawmakers or decisionmakers.
Registration and disclosure rules do not cut against an international organization’s capacity to gather the diverse nonstate views and the expertise of experts.
Signiﬁcantly, the lobbying framework offers no basis to maintain archaic, pathdependent distinctions between for-proﬁts and nonproﬁts that have become
meaningless in light of trade association and industry association lobbying activity. The framework also gives no reason to maintain a procedure that requires
“purposes and principles” in concert with the UN’s own, as the point is not to
administer an ex ante merit test, but rather to clarify the identities and intentions
of the diversity of groups that seek to offer input.
D. Caveats and Limitations
The beneﬁts of the lobbying framework in the international context are that
it better describes the actors, regulations, and activities of the access regimes in
international organizations like ECOSOC; that by doing so it clears out outdated
assumptions and makes room for meaningful reforms; and that it offers potential regulatory tools to structure these reforms. However, there are a number of
limitations and potential objections to the lobbying analysis. I will take them in
turn.
First, the access rights offered by international organizations do not map on
perfectly to lobbying rights, and the behavior of NGOs does not exactly mirror
that of lobbyists in the United States and elsewhere. In the United States, lobbying is understood as “an amalgam of a broad range of advocacy practices,”258
which include both informal and formal practices. Formal practices in the United
States are largely analogous to those on the international stage, as these include
appearing before Congress and submitting written comments, as well as engaging informally with members of Congress. But U.S. domestic practice diverges
in that it includes signiﬁcant elements of campaign ﬁnance and other quid pro
quo arrangements. I have ascertained no evidence of these latter arrangements

258.

McKinley, supra note 2, at 1188 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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internationally, and so campaign ﬁnance rules and tax law rules in the United
States do not have parallel applicability internationally.
However, the fact that not all regulatory tools used to respond to lobbying
activity in the United States and elsewhere are translatable to the international
context should not detract from the thrust of the argument. The point is not to
suggest an exact replication of U.S. regulatory strategies internationally, but instead to discern broad regulatory principles that characterize governmental responses to lobbying activity, and to suggest that those principles may be of use
internationally.259
Second, as considered brieﬂy in the previous Section, U.S. lobbying rules are
susceptible to critiques regarding under-enforcement and the limited utility of
disclosure. Nevertheless, as indicated above, these criticisms are less about the
regulatory approach itself than about challenges of regulating lobbying activity.
Finally, a lobbying frame carries a strong pejorative connotation in the
United States and abroad. As Maggie McKinley has noted, many Americans
“hold lobbyists in incredibly low regard,” “decry lobbying as rent seeking and a
corruption of the democratic process,” and believe that “more must be done to
regulate lobbying.”260 Richard Hasen points out that “[i]n difficult times like

259.

As previously mentioned, an alternative theoretical candidate to the lobbying frame is the notice-and-comment model drawn from U.S. domestic practice pursuant to the APA. But the
notice-and-comment process in the United States appears to diverge from the international
context in that it functions through a structured, top-down process. In practice, “off-the-record communications between government officials and private parties” do regularly occur.
Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 29, 62-63 (1985)
(considering whether the APA prohibits or at least requires disclosure of such contacts). In
fact, studies in administrative law show that lobbying is a pervasive force in the U.S. regulatory context despite the seemingly restrictive procedural restraints of the APA. See, e.g.,
Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J.
1321, 1365-66 (2010) (observing that while the APA “does require communications between
agencies and stakeholders to take place in the sunlight, . . . [b]oth before and after this transparent process . . . stakeholders and agency staff can negotiate regulatory policies in the shadows”); Wagner et al., supra note 192, at 102 (“[I]n practice, notice-and-comment rulemaking
may only be the tip of the iceberg in providing avenues for interest groups to inform agencies’
rulemaking projects.”). But recent reforms have not moderated or meaningfully structured
this activity. See, e.g., Susan Webb Yackee, The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying: Pre-Proposal Agenda
Building and Blocking During Agency Rulemaking, 22 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 373 (2012)
(using empirical data to analyze signiﬁcance of lobbying in the pre-proposal stage of rulemaking). So, in short, the notice-and-comment frame neither cleanly ﬁts the facts nor offers
meaningful reforms.
260. McKinley, supra note 2, at 1156-58; see also Cohen-Eliya & Hammer, supra note 71, at 265 (noting that some “deﬁn[e] lobbying by interest groups as ‘the most serious and worrisome problem of American democracy’” (quoting GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 25 (1965))).

1798

international lobbying law

these, when people are looking for someone to blame for a ﬁnancial meltdown,
[or] a failing health care system . . . lobbyists are a convenient target.”261 Distaste
for lobbying extends beyond the United States. A recent European Parliament
working paper suggested, with a degree of reserve, that “it should also be mentioned that the term ‘lobbyist’ still carries a rather negative meaning in a number
of other Community languages.”262 Part of the problem is that lobbying—a notoriously difficult term to deﬁne263—often implies more than offering suggestions to lawmakers and also connotes nefarious activities like bribery and capture. A working paper from the European Parliament acknowledged the
ambiguity of the term:
[O]ne advantage of using the term “lobbyist” is that, even though it is
often shunned in some countries and associated with the United States
“pork barrel” system, it is widely understood and the functions of the
lobbyist are more clearly recognised than other terms such as “government relations,” “public affairs” or “special interest groups.”264
The suggestion to transport the lobbying framework to the international
context is not meant to carry the implicit critique that international access regimes are plagued by inappropriate inﬂuences. Yet international organizations
may be reticent to adopt the lobbying frame given the apparent strength of its
pejorative connotations.
As foreshadowed at the beginning of this Article, the Article’s analysis showcases a strange dichotomy: while commentators evaluating international access
structures have regarded them with outsized optimism, commentators who evaluate lobbying regulation in the United States and elsewhere seem to express an
outsized cynicism about the law and practice of lobbying. Perhaps this is partially
a matter of semantics. This Article’s analysis suggests that both reactions may be
too extreme. The theory and practice of lobbying regulation might be better understood as a ﬂawed but useful means to understand and govern public participation in governance.
***

261.

Hasen, supra note 2, at 194.
Wilhelm Lehmann, Lobbying in the European Union: Current Rules and Practices 2 (European
Parliament, Directorate-Gen. for Research, Working Paper, 2003).
263. See, e.g., id. (“If lobbying essentially describes the direct advocacy of a point of view about a
matter of public policy, it is less clear as a description of the actual work undertaken by most
people in the lobbying industry.”).
264. Id.
262.

1799

the yale law journal

127:1742

2018

At bottom, the purpose of the lobbying analogy is to highlight the descriptive
fact that interest group lobbying is an international as well as domestic phenomenon; to reframe this international activity as interest group lobbying, rather
than multistakeholder membership in global governance, as strong legitimacy
optimism has long asserted; and to borrow useful regulatory tools vertically
across jurisdictions from the domestic to the international.
iv. international lobbying law: a typology
Drawing on the lobbying framework developed in Part III, this Part proposes
a typology of access structures across international organizations affiliated with
the United Nations. The account is stylized, but the simplicity is useful: it helps
identify common features within a heterogeneous set of consultation rules and
organize the prescriptive points offered in Part III.
Signiﬁcantly, the typology clariﬁes a set of tradeoffs that the lobbying analysis produces: officials can either embrace the lobbying frame as an organizing
principle for reform and focus on regulatory tools like registration and disclosure; or they can take another route entirely, building multistakeholder structures that welcome a smaller group of nonstate participants as full voting members. These two choices offer distinct tradeoffs. But I hypothesize that either has
the potential to better satisfy an organization’s goals with respect to nonstate
participation than the most common middle-ground approach. As the following
discussion suggests, that middle-ground approach is premised on the strong legitimacy optimism theory critiqued in this analysis, and also is the source of
many of the practical problems outlined in prior Parts.
A. The Lobbying Rules Map
The access structures at international organizations have a variety of common features. Mapping these features along two spectra produces useful ideal
types. Those types organize recurring features of the access rules and facilitate
exploration of the reform hypotheses this Part will propose.
To be sure, the typology by necessity cannot capture a great degree of variety
among the access structures. Nevertheless, the schema isolates meaningful similarities and variations, particularly as they pertain to private-sector lobbying. In
particular, nearly half of the UN organizations maintain regulatory structures
closely patterned on ECOSOC’s in the following respects: they have established
an accreditation system for NGOs, require nonproﬁt status (and thus exclude
individual businesses), and yet include business-promoting NGOs (such as industry and trade associations) on equal terms as other NGOs. The variations
from this standard access structure principally stretch along two dimensions.
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First, along a horizontal spectrum lie the degrees of regulatory control the
organization exercises over the types of entities that are permitted access to it. Of
course, since the analysis focuses on nongovernmental entities, this spectrum
does not include membership rules for state entities. On one end of the spectrum
are access rules that accept all would-be participants in the process. On the other
end are the rules that divide organizations into categories, with different access
rules applicable to each.
Second, along a vertical spectrum lie the degrees of opportunity for nongovernmental entities to shape an organization’s decisional process. For example, at the
top of this vertical spectrum lie international organizations that offer only access,
including limited persuasive rights like submission of position papers in a carefully regulated process, informal lobbying opportunities, and perhaps receipt of
bulletins and other information. At the bottom end are consultation structures
that welcome nonstate groups as full voting members in the process or otherwise
formalize and elevate nonstate input in the ultimate regulatory rules. Toward the
middle of this second spectrum are access structures that permit a form of participation more robust than mere access but short of full voting membership.
Organizations in this middle group may offer participation in discussions leading to consensus decision making, for example.
The two spectra identify a set of regulatory ideal types, as follow:
TABLE 1.

Less Categorical
Access

More Categorical

Generalist Classic

Moderate Classic

Specialist Classic

Generalist Innovator

Moderate Innovator

Specialist Innovator

Participation
Membership

Structures at the top of the vertical spectrum I call “classics” whereas those
at the bottom are “innovators.” This is not to say that structures at the top were
necessarily developed earlier in time than the others. Rather, classic structures
hew to classic legal understandings about the relative statuses of nation-states
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and nonstate actors.265 Structures at the bottom innovate by disrupting those
classic international legal understandings. They offer more access to nonstate
entities and spread authority beyond nation-state delegates. They dispense with
the bare consultation structure and incorporate more nonstate authority over the
end result through voting or participation in a consensus procedure. Of course,
there is room all along this spectrum, with some organizations falling into a middle zone between classic and innovator.
Another set of observations may be made about the location of an organization along the horizontal spectrum. I will call organizations toward the left “generalist,” and toward the right “specialist.” Generalist organizations accept all entrants on equal terms. Specialist structures have restricted access criteria, giving
access to only certain kinds of groups or making many distinctions between
kinds of groups and offering different access rights. Thus, we have “generalist
classics” in the top left corner, “specialist innovators” in the bottom right corner,
and so on.
To reiterate, organizing the access rules in this manner reduces spectra to
simpliﬁed ideal types. Mapping all UN-affiliated organizations according to
more precise locations on the intersecting spectra would produce a scatter diagram, rather than a typology.
As a descriptive matter, I propose that each of the locations on the map represents a set of tradeoffs: between maintaining administrability and balancing
nonstate inputs; between preserving state sovereignty and capturing robust
nonstate expertise and engagement; between openness and selectiveness. I theorize that organizations should choose their point on the lobbying rules map
according to their distinctive organizational goals. While it appears that over
time there has been a rightward drift along the horizontal spectrum, from organizations that make fewer distinctions among organizations to those who
make more (from generalist to specialist), I hypothesize that organizations have
not been able to reap the beneﬁts they may have hoped to reap from that movement because they have not made a corresponding movement down the vertical

265.

According to this view, nation-states are sovereign and possess the capacity to determine their
own fates, so they are the only actors that may make law for themselves. Nations may sometimes delegate their lawmaking authority to international organizations; but nonstate entities
have no capacity to make international law. See 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
TREATISE 341 (1905) (“Since the Law of Nations is a law between States only and exclusively,
States only and exclusively are subjects of the Law of Nations.”); see also JAN KLABBERS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 53–73 (2d ed. 2009) (comparing theories that institutions with lawmaking and adjudicatory powers derive their authority either
from an initial act of express delegation or from implied powers); Duncan B. Hollis, Why
State Consent Still Matters—Non-State Actors, Treaties, and the Changing Sources of International
Law, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 137, 146–71 (2005) (describing international lawmaking powers
by nonstate actors pursuant to delegations of authority from states).

1802

international lobbying law

spectrum (toward specialist innovator). These observations underpin my proposal that organizations should consider strategies that leave them in the far top
left corner (generalist classic) or bottom right (specialist innovator), and eschew
middle-of-the-map solutions.
To pave the way for that discussion, the following table shows how the ideal
types might be replaced by consultation structures at a number of international
organizations. The examples are far from exhaustive. Rather, they are selected to
capture the diversity of structures that exist:
TABLE 2.

Less Categorical
IMF
Access

(Cf. U.S. APA Notice &
Comment procedure)

Participation

Membership

More Categorical
ECOSOC
Codex
(Most Populated Area)

UNCITRAL

(Null set)

WHO
FAO

UNAids
ILO
GAVI
UN Women

1. The ECOSOC Structure and Its Progeny Are Moderate Classics
UN-affiliated organizations typically fall into the “moderate classic” portion
of the rules map. The cluster is largely due to many international organizations’
reliance on ECOSOC’s structure as a starting point for regulatory design.
As for the horizontal spectrum, the ECOSOC rules do not accept all potential
participants, but rather have some sort of access criteria and screening or application mechanism. This is, I submit, a direct result of the eminence of strong
legitimacy optimism as a normative basis for regulatory design. Over time, the
ECOSOC rules were amended and reformed in an attempt to make divisions
between associations to achieve a representative set of “consultants,” gradually
moving the ECOSOC rules along the horizontal spectrum from left to right and
into the moderate category over time. Thus, the ECOSOC rules now have a gatekeeping structure that requires potential lobbyists to apply for accreditation.
Only some groups can obtain this status. Notably, individuals and for-proﬁt organizations are excluded, along with any organization that cannot assert “aims
and purposes” that support the UN’s work and demonstrate that it has internal
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governance structures that make it accountable to its membership.266 Rather
than simply offering comments on an ad hoc basis, consultants must prepare an
application and be voted in by a nineteen-member NGO committee. Most must
then provide quadrennial reports to maintain their accreditation status and corresponding access.
ECOSOC rules fall at the top of the vertical scale and thus are “classic” because they hew to a classic state/nonstate hierarchy of authority. The impact a
nonstate entity can have over the rulemaking process is limited to receiving information and exercising various forms of persuasion such as offering written or
oral comments or informally buttonholing delegates outside of meeting rooms.
Lobbying groups do not, for example, participate in decision making, voting,
forming a consensus, or otherwise adopting rules. In addition, consultants are
organized into various tiers corresponding to the breadth of scope of their mission, with organizations given more or less expansive access rights depending on
their accreditation tier. ECOSOC is not classiﬁed as a “specialist” organization in
this analysis because its accreditation forms a very broad tent. Many different
kinds of associations make up the approximately ﬁve thousand that currently
hold accreditation, from small groups of grassroots activists to familiar NGO
mega-groups like Amnesty International, to academic and professional associations like the American Society of International Law and, as is particularly relevant to this project, to industry and trade associations who lobby on behalf of
for-proﬁt entities.
The Codex Alimentarius (Codex) is an illuminating example of the dominance of the moderate classic access rules for two reasons. First, the organization
has received some scholarly attention as an outlier in terms of its nonstate access
rules, but nevertheless still falls into the well-established and relatively common
“moderate classic” category. Second, unlike a number of other organizations including ECOSOC, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), and WHO, the Codex’s access structure was not originally
authorized in a charter provision but instead from separately adopted rules of
procedure; yet in practice the rules end up preserving the moderate classic
norm.267

266.

Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 3, ¶¶ 2–12 (prescribing that a consultant organization must have, inter alia, a democratically adopted constitution, representative
process of governance, and authorized representatives who speak for the organization’s membership).
267. Procedural Manual, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM’N 16-17 (1st ed. 1968), ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Publications/ProcManuals/Manual_01e.pdf; cf. Procedural Manual, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM’N 237-48 (25th ed. 2016), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5995e.pdf [http://perma.cc
/WA32-58GW].
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Codex was established jointly by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) and the WHO in 1962,268 and later adopted Rules of Procedure elaborating access rules which grant “observer” status to nonstate entities. That status is
available automatically to NGOs with relationships with Codex’s founding organizations (the FAO and WHO),269 and to other NGOs that apply to the Secretary of the Commission and meet criteria which closely follow the ECOSOC
blueprint.270 An eligible NGO must, inter alia: (1) be international in structure
and scope of activity, and representative of the specialized ﬁeld of interest in
which it operates; (2) be concerned with matters covering a part or all of the
Commission’s ﬁeld of activity; (3) have aims and purposes that conform to the
Commission’s objectives; and (4) have a representative leadership structure that
is responsive to its membership.271 The FAO and WHO make ﬁnal determinations about whether to grant observer status at Codex,272 which 147 NGOs have

268.

Notably, the conference that established Codex was attended by representatives of forty-four
member countries of the FAO and WHO as well as by observers from fourteen NGOs, including a variety of trade associations (e.g., the Federation of Margarine Associations, the International Office of Cocoa and Chocolate, and the International Dairy Federation). See Report
on Joint FAO/ WHO Conference on Food Standards, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM’N 36 (Oct.
1962), http://www.fao.org/input/download/report/715/al62_08e.pdf [http://perma.cc
/QX8G-BHKM].
269. Id. Observer status is also possible for nonmember nations and other intergovernmental organizations. Id.
270. The application requests information on the aims and subjects of the organization, structure
of the organization, meetings concerned with matters covering the Commission’s ﬁeld of activity, relations with other international organizations, expected contributions to the Commission, past activities in relation to Codex, and an indication of the source of funding. Information Required from International Non-Governmental Organizations Requesting “Observer
Status,” CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM’N (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.fao.org/fao-who
-codexalimentarius/members-observers/ngo-participation/en [http://perma.cc/DU89
-PSHH].
271. Finally, the organization must have been established for at least three years prior to applying
for observer status. Principles Concerning the Participation of International Non-Governmental
Organizations in the Work of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS
COMM’N (Aug. 18, 2016) [hereinafter Principles Concerning Participation], http://www.fao.org
/fao-who-codexalimentarius/members-observers/ngo-participation/en [http://perma.cc
/DU89-PSHH]. Through its collaboration with international NGOs, Codex seeks “expert information, advice and assistance from international non-governmental organizations and to
enable organizations which represent important sections of public opinion . . . to express the
views of their members and to play an appropriate role in ensuring the harmonizing of intersectoral interests.” Id.
272. Id.
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currently obtained.273 Of these, approximately sixty, or just over one-third, are
associations representing a speciﬁc trade or industry, including organizations
such as the European Potato Trade Association, International Chewing Gum Association, and International Frozen Foods Association.274
Thus, although Codex has been hailed as an example of innovation because
of the presence of so many private-sector groups, the access rules in fact are not
structurally different from the mainstream. The Codex structure is moderate in
that, like ECOSOC, it does not accept all potential participants, but only participants with particular governance structures and interests. Codex has a classic
consultation structure because, just like ECOSOC, NGOs with observer status
enjoy a range of privileges including informational and consultation privileges,
but no full membership or voting privileges. These NGOs may send an observer
to sessions of the Commission and subsidiary bodies; receive working documents and discussion papers from the Secretary of the Commission; circulate to
the Commission views in writing; and participate in discussions when invited
by the Chairperson.275 The fact that Codex has received attention as an innovator
may perhaps simply be a result of the fact that private-sector access has been
underappreciated in other international organizations.
2. Reforms Have Produced More Specialist Structures
A number of international organizations have deviated from ECOSOC’s approach due to perceived shortcomings, such as too much access, too little regulation, lack of administrability by overburdened gatekeepers, and the potential
capture of officials in sensitive matters of public policy like global health.276
For example, the WHO has an accreditation system quite explicitly modeled
on ECOSOC’s. In fact, the WHO Constitution has a parallel Article 71 that states,
nearly identically to the UN Charter’s Article 71, that the WHO “may, on matters

273.

Codex Observers, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM’N (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.fao.org/fao
-who-codexalimentarius/members-observers/observers/en [http://perma.cc/J5SK
-W7WH].
274. Id.
275. NGOs may also be invited by the Directors-General to participate in, and submit views in
writing to, meetings or seminars on subjects organized by the FAO/WHO Standards Programme. Observers also receive documentation and information about planned meetings
agreed upon with the Secretariat. Principles Concerning Participation, supra note 271.
276. See, e.g., Ayelet Berman, Industry, Regulatory Capture and Transnational Standard Setting, 111
AJIL UNBOUND 112, 113-15 (2017) (discussing the risk of regulatory capture in transnational
standard setting and regulation and offering several examples of WHO capture).
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within its competence, make suitable arrangements for consultation and co-operation with non-governmental international organizations and . . . with national organizations, governmental or non-governmental.”277 Notably, the
WHO Constitution retains both the “non-governmental organizations” language as well as language authorizing “suitable arrangements for consultation”
from the UN Charter’s parallel Article 71. The WHO provision diverges only in
that it includes the word “co-operation,” potentially authorizing a broader scope
of consultation rights for nonstate actors. This explicit borrowing of the UN
Charter language is unsurprising in light of the fact that the WHO Constitution
was negotiated just a month after the UN Charter was signed in June 1946.
Over time, however, the practices of the two organizations have diverged. In
May 2016, the World Health Assembly adopted a new Framework of Engagement for the WHO’s interactions with nonstate actors.278 Notably, the Framework erects a separate set of rules for “private sector entities” and “international
business associations” than for “nongovernmental organizations,”279 with additional safeguards in place for engagement with the private sector.280 The Framework’s safeguards are meant to guard against conﬂicts of interest that might have
negative impacts on the “WHO’s integrity, independence, credibility and reputation; and public health mandate.”281 This distinction between the two groups
responds to the WHO’s embattled history with private-sector inﬂuences.282
The WHO’s experience with tobacco association inﬁltration in fact demonstrates the potential risks of degradation of information value that ﬂow from
private-sector group participation when conﬂicts of interest between an international organization’s agenda and private-sector agendas arise. Philip Morris and
others engaged in “an elaborate, well ﬁnanced, sophisticated, and usually invisible” campaign to discredit and impede the WHO, “hid[ing] behind a variety of
ostensibly independent quasi-academic, public policy, and business organiza-

277.

WHO CONST. art. 71. The constitution was adopted by the International Health Conference
held in New York from June 19 to July 22, 1946, signed on July 22, 1946 by the representatives
of sixty-one states, and entered into force on April 7, 1948. Id. at 1 n.1; see United Nations
World Health Organization Interim Commission, Summary Report on Proceedings, Minutes,
and Final Acts of the International Health Conference, Held in New York from 19 June to 22 July
1946, in 2 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 99 (1948).
278. WHO, Framework, supra note 16.
279. Id. at Annex, ¶ 10.
280. Id. at Annex, ¶¶ 13, 45.
281. Id. at Annex, ¶ 7(c).
282. See, e.g., TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES, supra note 99. The committee authoring this report
was convened by the WHO Director-General. Id. at ii.
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tions,” including “trade unions, tobacco company-created front groups and tobacco companies’ own affiliated food companies.”283 As one example among
many, the International Tobacco Growers’ Association, a private-sector association that originally represented a small group of tobacco farmers, came to be
controlled by the larger tobacco industry in order to serve as a “front for [their]
third world lobby activities at WHO,” meant speciﬁcally to “undermine WHO
tobacco control activities.”284 To avoid a repeat of these negative experiences in
the new Framework, the WHO articulated a policy change: the WHO would no
longer “engage with the tobacco industry,” the arms industry, or any nonstate
actors that advance those industries’ work.285 And it would “exercise particular
caution” when engaging with other entities whose policies or activities are “negatively affecting human health and are not in line with WHO’s policies, norms
and standards.”286
To carry out these new policies, the Framework broadly deﬁnes “private sector entity” to include commercial enterprises as well as “international business
associations . . . that do not intend to make a proﬁt for themselves but represent
the interests of their members, which are commercial enterprises.”287 In addition,
the category includes other entities or associations that are not sufficiently independent from their commercial sponsors. The WHO takes upon itself the task
of determining if an entity should be categorized as a private-sector entity due
to the fact that it is the recipient of “undue inﬂuence” from commercial entities
through ﬁnancing, participation in decision making, or otherwise.288 For example, other NGOs, philanthropic foundations, or academic institutions may be
categorized as private-sector entities and thus also be subject to the WHO’s new
provisions on engagement with this type of entity.289 In order to equip its gatekeepers with sufficient information to determine which entities might have such
private-sector relationships, all would-be consultant organizations are required
to provide detailed information on their membership, legal status, objectives,
governance structure, assets, income and funding sources, affiliations, webpage,
and other data so that the WHO can conduct its own due diligence.290 The

283.

Id. at iii, 3-5.
Id. at 47-48.
285. WHO, Framework, supra note 16, at Annex, ¶ 44.
286. Id. at Annex, ¶ 45.
287. Id. at Annex, ¶ 10.
288. Id. at Annex, ¶ 13.
289. Id.
290. Id. at Annex, ¶ 39.
284.
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WHO’s due diligence process is explicitly aimed at determining why an organization seeks access and what interests it may have.291 Along with the Framework,
the WHO established an electronic tool for managing engagement that contains
a register of nonstate actors and identiﬁcation of potential conﬂicts of interest.292
The WHO’s innovative reform ﬂows from an ex ante normative judgment
about the beneﬁts and risks that attach to private-sector participation. But, as
the discussion in Section II.C.2 noted, this reform may prove to be unsuccessful,293 overburdening already taxed gatekeepers294 and offering no realistic
means to respond to the fact that NGOs often have close links and partnerships
with the corporate world.295
To return to the lobbying rules map, the WHO’s recent reforms have driven
it to the right, toward specialist classic. The access rules are now specialist because
they regulate different nongovernmental entities differently, attempting to erect
separate inﬂuence pipelines for public-interest NGOs on the one hand and, on
the other, for private-sector entities and any other entities that might be unduly
inﬂuenced by those private-sector entities. They are classic because, like
ECOSOC, they offer nonstate entities mere access, rather than membership or
deep participation in government.
Like the WHO, the FAO is a specialist because it distinguishes between public-interest NGOs and private-sector entities. Like the WHO, the FAO was established in 1945296 and has a long history of engaging with external entities.297

291.

Id. at Annex, ¶ 31 (stating that the objective is to “clarify the interest and objectives of the
entity in engaging with WHO and what it expects in return”).
292. Id. at Annex, ¶¶ 21, 38; see also WHO Register of Non-State Actors, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/about/collaborations/non-state-actors/register [http://perma.cc
/DV88-CEPD].
293. See Durkee, supra note 14, at 206-07.
294. Id. at 205.
295. See id. at 253-54.
296. About FAO, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/about/en
[http://perma.cc/6KAA-77A4]. The organization’s goals are “the eradication of hunger, food
insecurity and malnutrition; the elimination of poverty and the driving forward of economic
and social progress for all; and the sustainable management and utilization of natural resources.” Id. The FAO now has 194 member nations, two associate members, and one member
organization—the European Union. Membership of FAO, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/legal/home/membership-of-fao/en [http://perma.cc/33KK
-8YKN].
297. FAO Strategy for Partnerships with Civil Society Organizations, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 1 (2013), http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3443e/i3443e.pdf [http://perma
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The FAO now deﬁnes the organizations that are eligible for access as “Civil Society Organizations” (CSOs), which are “those non-state actors that work in the
areas related to FAO’s mandate.”298 These include member-based organizations,
NGOs, and social movements.299 Unlike the WHO, the FAO explicitly excludes
private-sector entities.300 Beyond the distinction between CSOs and private-sector entities, the FAO’s access structure is fairly traditional. CSOs have two main
avenues through which to engage with the FAO: formal accreditation and informal collaboration. As for accreditation, as with ECOSOC,301 qualiﬁed international NGOs may apply for and obtain one of three potential types of formal
status—consultative, specialized consultative, or liaison status—based on the
importance of the CSO’s work to the activities of the FAO.302 To obtain any of
these types of formal status, CSOs must meet representational criteria, possess
“aims and purposes” in accordance with the FAO’s work, and demonstrate sufﬁcient accountability to the CSO’s membership through a formal governance
structure.303 Unlike at ECOSOC, at the FAO, formal status will not be considered until a CSO has cooperated with the FAO at a technical level during at least
a two-year period.304
The FAO has also recently instituted reforms with respect to its relationships
with the private sector. In 2013 and 2015 documents, the FAO articulated rules in
which the private sector is deﬁned as “all sectors of the food, agriculture, forestry
and ﬁsheries systems—from production to consumption—and all sizes of enterprise . . . as well as related trade, ﬁnancial and other service organizations.”305 In

.cc/WT7T-77RJ] (“Only through effective collaboration with governments, civil society, private sector, academia, research centres and cooperatives, and making use of each other’s
knowledge and comparative advantages, can food insecurity be defeated.”).
298. Id. at 3.
299. Id. at 17.
300. Id. at 8 (“In principle, food producer organizations will fall under the private sector strategy,
unless they state otherwise and comply with the criteria for CSOs.”).
301. See supra Section I.A.
302. 2 Basic Texts of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FOOD AND AGRIC.
ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS § M, ¶¶ 2, 6-8 (2015), http://www.fao.org/3/a-mp046e.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8KVY-TCCB].
303. Id. at § M, ¶¶ 6-8.
304. Frequently Asked Questions, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.fao
.org/partnerships/civil-society/faq/en [http://perma.cc/T3MX-X4B6].
305. Principles and Guidelines for FAO Cooperation with the Private Sector, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 5 (2000), http://www.fao.org/3/a-x2215e.pdf [http://perma.cc/HC2X
-5ZZJ] (emphasis omitted); see also FAO Strategy for Partnerships with the Private Sector, FOOD
& AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS 13 (2013), http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3444e
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a marked divergence from the ECOSOC norm, the FAO’s deﬁnition of for-proﬁt
enterprises also includes “enterprises, companies or businesses . . . private ﬁnancial institutions; industry and trade associations; and consortia that represent
private sector interests.”306 Private-sector entities may not be granted formal status or accreditation, but may engage in less formalized ways.307
Finally, another organization that has moved to the right along the horizontal dimension from the ECOSOC norm toward specialist classic is the UNFCCC.
In most respects, the UNFCCC accreditation system follows that of ECOSOC.
But in an effort to enhance administrability, the organization has developed a set
of categories that differentiate between different kinds of NGOs. These categories include “research and independent NGOs (‘RINGOs’), business and industry NGOs (‘BINGOs’), environmental NGOs (‘ENGOs’), local NGOs, indigenous peoples organizations (‘IPOs’), local government and municipal
authorities (‘LGMAs’), islanders, trade unions, and faith-based groups.”308 The
categories do not affect the amount of access a particular organization receives
when accredited, but are rather designed to help organizations coordinate with
each other and help the UNFCCC communicate in a coordinated fashion with
them.
The UNFCCC’s access structure falls somewhere between moderate classic
and specialist classic along the horizontal spectrum. The UNFCCC maintains
the fundamental distinction that ECOSOC introduced between for-proﬁt and
nonproﬁt entities, accepting only the latter for accreditation. That is, all accredited organizations must be NGOs, even though the rules recognize that different
NGOs will have different constituencies. Moreover, even though the UNFCCC
separates constituencies into different tracks, it does not regulate access differently for different groups, unlike the WHO and the FAO, which endeavor to
separate private-sector inﬂuences from the rest and manage that private-sector

/i3444e.pdf [http://perma.cc/M7HK-A8KR] (“The private sector includes enterprises, companies or businesses, regardless of size, ownership and structure.”). The 2000 guidelines were
renewed in 2015. See Progress Report on FAO Strategy for Partnerships with the Private Sector 4
(2016), http://www.fao.org/3/a-mr854e.pdf [http://perma.cc/XW2X-Y3CW].
306. Private Sector, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.fao.org
/partnerships/private-sector/en [http://perma.cc/5DMN-QTVT].
307. FAO Strategy for Partnerships with the Private Sector, supra note 305, at 18. The FAO Strategy for
Partnerships with the Private Sector describes the main areas and types of engagement between
the FAO and private-sector entities, including “development and implementation of technical
programmes, policy dialogue, norms and standard setting, advocacy and communication,
knowledge management and dissemination, and mobilization of resources.” Id. at 4; see also
id. at 18 (noting that most collaborations and all private-sector partnerships must be governed
by a written agreement that formalizes the terms of agreement, typically involving memoranda of understanding, “Partnership Agreements,” or “Exchange of Letters”).
308. Tully, supra note 153, at 16.
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relationship on separate and more restrictive terms. The UNFCCC is also a “classic” organization like all of the organizations so far examined in this Section because of the limited impact organizations are permitted to assert over the decision-making process.
3. Outliers Exist
A minority of organizations diverge from the well-trod path between moderate and specialist classic regulatory formats.
One outlier classic organization is the IMF. The consultation structure lands
on the “generalist” end of the horizontal spectrum because, unlike in other UN
agencies and bodies, there appears to be no speciﬁc set of criteria that must be
followed in selecting nonstate actors that may engage. In fact, the IMF does not
have a formal accreditation process through which it structures its relationships
with nonstate actors. Instead, IMF engagement takes a variety of informal and
formal forms at the global and country levels. The IMF broadly deﬁnes CSOs to
include:
[N]ongovernmental organizations (NGOs), business forums, faithbased organizations, labor unions and professional organizations, local
community groups, philanthropic and charitable organizations, gender
and women’s associations, local organizations of persons with disabilities, social movements (including representatives of the informal sector
and rural areas), academics, research centers and think tanks.309
Rather than have a concrete accreditation procedure with set admission criteria,
IMF staff are simply cautioned that it is a best practice to “[c]onduct[] due diligence on the legitimacy of the selected CSO” in order “to ensure proper representation within the country and avoid interaction with politically motivated organizations.”310
The IMF is also far toward the top “classic” end of the vertical spectrum because, in marked contrast to the equal membership of state and nonstate entities
at the International Labour Organization (ILO), discussed below, the IMF’s

309.

2015 Guidelines on the IMF Staff Engagement with Civil Society Organizations, INT’L MONETARY
FUND 2 n.2 [hereinafter IMF CSO Guidelines], http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/cs/pdf
/CSOGuidelinesMarch2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/7JHL-2PGT]. CSOs can focus on a particular country or region or “have a global operation.” Id.
310. Id. at 6 (directing staff to use internal resources such as regional and technical offices as well
as drawing on the IMF Communication Department’s CSO database).
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methods of engagement with nonstate entities are classically hierarchical. Nonstate actors have a variety of points of contact with IMF policymakers, but no
decision-making authority. These points of contact can include meetings and forums; public consultations on the IMF’s policy and strategy papers; meetings
and seminars with IMF staff and executive directors on speciﬁc policy or country
issues; invitations by the IMF to contribute to review of the IMF’s policies at
seminars or on its external website; and a “Civil Society Policy Forum” held
jointly with meetings of the IMF and World Bank.311
In a process somewhat analogous to the notice-and-comment process in the
United States, a key way that CSOs can engage with the IMF is through public
and private consultations.312 The public consultation process is “an open call for
feedback from CSOs, and interested stakeholders” that runs for approximately
six to eight weeks.313 Interested CSOs and stakeholders submit comments that
become part of the official record through an online platform, phone conferences, or emails.314 IMF departments sometimes conduct a “road-show” during
the public consultation period to help ensure that CSOs and other key stakeholders understand the issue and to receive their direct feedback.315 At the end
of the public consultation, all comments received are made public on the online
platform.316 Public consultations have taken place on issues including, for example, ﬁnancial-sector taxation, low-income countries’ facilities review, and natural

311.

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Factsheet: The IMF and Civil Society Organizations, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Apr. 2017), http://
www.imf.org/About/Factsheets/The-IMF-and-Civil-Society-Organizations?pdf=1 [http://
perma.cc/9JS5-SQHF]. Importantly, many of the sessions covered at the Civil Society Policy
Forum are organized by the CSOs. The Policy Forum also includes a Fellowship Program for
CSOs that was initiated by the IMF in 2003 to increase diversity in CSO attendance. The
program sponsors twenty to forty CSO fellows, mainly from developing countries and emerging market economies, to participate in the meetings. See IMF CSO Guidelines, supra note 309,
at 12-13. At the country level, engagement with CSOs is also undertaken in a variety of different forms. Generally, IMF staff are encouraged to engage with CSOs during the three major
phases of IMF in-country mission work—i.e., pre-mission, on-mission, and post-mission
phases—in order to seek consultation on program design and implementation. Id. at 9-12.
IMF staff engagement with CSOs ranges from “in-depth one-on-one meetings” to “group
meetings” with representatives from a number of CSOs. Id. at 10.
IMF CSO Guidelines, supra note 309, at 14-15.
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 17.
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resources.317 The IMF also engages with CSOs by inviting participation in targeted and closed consultations for more sensitive or complex policy issues.318
These private consultations can take the form of “off-the-record meetings or
conference calls” and are often organized to seek initial CSO input to inform the
IMF’s thinking prior to opening up the consultation to a wider set of CSOs.319
This process again parallels U.S. administrative-law practice in the period prior
to notice-and-comment rulemaking.
In short, the IMF has adopted a consultation model closest to that of the U.S.
administrative notice-and-comment procedure because it actively seeks input
from a broad cross-section of nonstate actors without imposing categorical constraints such as requiring nonproﬁt status. Nevertheless, the model welcomes
consultation rather than participation in that it does not entitle the nonstate actors
to engage in any decision-making capacity.
A second outlier is the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL), which falls somewhere toward the exact center of the lobbying rules map on both horizontal and vertical spectra. On the vertical spectrum, UNCITRAL falls between the ILO and IMF (between classic and innovator) because nonstate actors can signiﬁcantly affect the organization’s decisional
processes, but participation by nonstate actors falls short of full membership, as
the ILO affords. This is because nonstate actors are in practice able to participate
in the consensus required for UNCITRAL’s adoption of legal rules, even though
those nonstate actors do not possess de jure voting rights. On the horizontal
spectrum, UNCITRAL also falls toward the middle because it does not permit
all entrants to access its meetings and consensus-forming procedures (unlike the
IMF), but exercises some control over which entities are entitled to participate in
the work of the Commission (like ECOSOC).320
Because this organization’s relationship with nonstate actors is somewhat
unique, it merits a more sustained analysis. First, UNCITRAL’s work helps explain its unique relationship with nonstate actors: it focuses on the international
trade law that governs the relationship between private parties, developing rules
related to international contracting, payments, insolvency, secured transactions,
sale of goods, and so forth. The organization is composed of sixty member states
elected by the General Assembly for six-year terms and carries out its agenda-

317.

Id. at 14.
Id.
319. Id. Often, the policy issues considered require “consensus building at the membership level,
or . . . have a complex preparation process.” Id. at 15.
320. Id. at 15.
318.
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setting work at annual sessions, with more frequent working groups on particular subjects.321 Working groups draft the legal instruments in particular subject
areas322 and are assisted by preparatory work developed by the UNCITRAL secretariat in consultation with experts.323 Notably, UNCITRAL develops draft instruments that states may later choose to adopt, including conventions, model
laws, legislative guides, and model provisions.324 The fact that many of the
norms UNCITRAL produces are both nonbinding325 and of very keen interest
to nonstate actors helps explain why nonstate actors have been afforded more
extensive participatory rights than is normal for other organizations.
Second, UNCITRAL is very open to outside observers. Both nonmember
states and nonstate actors are called “observers,” and the deliberation process is
open to both.326 UNCITRAL “maintains mailing lists of organizations whose
expertise is relevant to issues addressed by the various working groups” and will
send invitation letters to various organizations to request expertise for a particular working group meeting or general meetings.327 Organizations may be
placed on the mailing lists at their own request, provided the Secretariat and the
member states approve the request.328 UNCITRAL will continue to send invitations to particular organizations “so long as their work remains relevant.”329 Observers may circulate documents to working groups, and have the same rights as
member states to make statements and respond to proposals.330 In short, these
observers (both nonmember states and nonstate entities) share the access rights
of the member-state participants on equal terms.
321.

322.

323.
324.

325.

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

See FAQ—Origin, Mandate and Composition of UNCITRAL, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON
INT’L TRADE L., http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin_faq.html [http://perma
.cc/XZ6F-GXSD]; see also Kelly, supra note 16, at 108.
Id. In 2005, the six working groups addressed subjects such as arbitration, insolvency law, and
electronic commerce. The UNCITRAL Guide: Basic Facts About the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law, UNITED NATIONS 5 n.12 (2007), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf
/english/texts/general/06-50941_Ebook.pdf [http://perma.cc/7H5K-84CQ].
Kelly, supra note 16, at 108.
The UNCITRAL Guide: Basic Facts About the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law, supra note 322, at 13-17 (reviewing UNCITRAL’s use of these various legislative techniques).
See id. Although UNCITRAL at times produces draft treaties that become binding when states
sign and ratify them, it also produces model legislation and legislative guides and recommendations, none of which are binding on member states. Id.
Kelly, supra note 16, at 111 & n.39 (“UNCITRAL . . . prides itself on its openness.”).
Id. at 111 n.40.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 112 n.42.
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Third, UNCITRAL has developed unusual consensus voting rules. Rather
than being established as an organ or agency of the UN (like ECOSOC, the
WHO, and the IMF) or a treaty body (like the UNFCCC), UNCITRAL was
established by the General Assembly331 and has declared that the General Assembly’s Rules of Procedure will apply where appropriate, as UNCITRAL itself
has no distinct rules of procedure.332 Largely, however, UNCITRAL has developed its own idiosyncratic and nonformalized working methods. Under these
methods, both the working groups and the Commission act by consensus rather
than by voting. But consensus does not mean unanimity. Rather, it is something
closer to a “substantially prevailing view”333 that does not allow a veto by any
individual state.334 As UNCITRAL’s literature explains, “[t]he basis of consensus is that efforts are made to address all concerns raised so that the ﬁnal text is
acceptable to all.”335 This decisional structure is particularly important because,
as Claire Kelly has recently noted, nonstate observers can shape the consensus
process and thus have inﬂuence akin to voting rights.336
The openness of UNCITRAL’s working methods to nonstate actors—combined with the consensus voting mechanism—produced a controversy between
UNCITRAL member states that reveals the depth of inﬂuence held by nonstate
observers. In 2007, France challenged current practices and called for a review of
the meaning of consensus and the level of nonmember participation. France
noted that the “NGOs play a major role because of the expertise they possess in
the areas under discussion.”337 In particular, France observed that when UNCITRAL seeks to draft a new legal instrument, it is the nonstate experts and the
groups that they represent that initiate the process and provide much of the technical expertise. These groups are neither representatives nor delegates of any
member and they operate without any guidelines. France also noted the rise of

331.

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

337.

G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI) (Dec. 17, 1966). UNCITRAL was established in 1966 for the purpose
of reducing disparities in national laws governing international trade by harmonizing and
unifying those laws. Id. at 99.
Kelly, supra note 16, at 106-07.
Id. at 111 (citation omitted).
Id. at 110-11.
FAQ—Methods of Work, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L., http://www
.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/methods_faq.html [http://perma.cc/R3CG-6QWC].
Kelly, supra note 16, at 111-12. Kelly’s analysis is based on documentation of a dispute between
UNCITRAL member states in which France was concerned that the robust participation of
nonstate observers served to dilute nation-state inﬂuence over the proceedings. See id. at 11320.
Id. at 114 (quoting France’s Observations on UNCITRAL’s Working Methods, ¶ 3.1, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/635 (May 24, 2007)).
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NGO inﬂuence, observing that in the past there were only a small number of
NGOs active within UNCITRAL, whereas now the number has expanded
greatly, with a substantial effect on the ultimate UNCITRAL work product.338
Highlighting the uniqueness of UNCITRAL’s relationship with nonstate actors, one of France’s complaints was that nonstate actor participation exceeds
that permitted by ECOSOC’s Resolution 1996/31, which it claimed provides the
“general framework” for NGO activities that UNCITRAL should follow.339
Moreover, France complained that these nonstate entities are not properly
NGOs, but rather should be called “non-state entities” or “professional associations.”340 Finally, France objected to the fact that distinctions between member
states and observers have frequently been blurred, in part because observers are
permitted to circulate working documents on their own initiative and are able to
speak at any time during the process.341 Notably, France alleged and the Secretariat “readily admit[ted]” that this collapsing of distinctions allows nonstate
entities outsized inﬂuence because of the consensus decision-making procedure,
since it is unclear when the speakers are true members and when they are observers.342 Without a vote, more input by nonstate entities readily inﬂuences the
sense of a room with respect to whether consensus has been achieved.
France sought to limit the inﬂuence of these entities by moving UNCITRAL’s access rules up the vertical spectrum, to use this Article’s framework.
France sought more of a classic structure, as it advocated for a process whereby
the working groups may determine who will attend their meetings and shut out
the nonstate entities when they so choose. France also sought to move toward
the right of the horizontal spectrum toward the specialist end by establishing an
accreditation mechanism for NGOs, with separate categories for entities with
general expertise and more speciﬁc expertise. The accreditation process would
also specify the participatory rights of these organizations and limit their rights
to contribute to the formation or blocking of consensus. In sum, France’s objections demonstrate concerns both about administrability and about the relative
status of nonstate entities in relation to state entities; they sought to preserve the
sovereign right of states to exert control over the international lawmaking process.

338.

Kelly, supra note 16, at 115.
Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 116.
342. Id.
339.
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4. The New Multistakeholder Institutions Are Specialist Innovators
While the spectrum of organizations along the horizontal classic dimension
is well-populated based on the ECOSOC model, a cluster of specialist innovators
have different origin stories. This corner of the rules map is becoming increasingly populated. For example, the ILO has a very unusual access structure in
which “labour unions and businesses are formal participants in the ILO’s work
and deliberative processes.”343 The ILO’s structure is known as “tripartite”—labor unions, businesses, and nation-states operate as participants on equal terms.
This structure makes the ILO unusual among international organizations,344
particularly since the ILO is not a contemporary innovator, but rather an early,
pre-World War II institution, founded in 1919 as part of the Treaty of Versailles
that ended World War I.345 The ILO is a specialist in our analysis because it divides the private sector from other nonstate actors—in this instance labor unions—and gives each a distinct status. It is an innovator in that nonstate actors
are full members.
A much more modern outlier in the same “specialist innovator” quadrant as
the ILO is UN Women. This organization serves as an exemplar of a very recent
trend: in the last ten to ﬁfteen years before this writing, a number of organizations have adopted innovative structures offering nonstate actors robust membership rights. For many years, the ILO would have been the only organization
in this quadrant; now a number of organizations crowd the ﬁeld. UN Women
was established in July 2010 by a General Assembly resolution,346 which
“[r]ecognizes that civil society organizations, in particular women’s organizations, play a vital role in promoting women’s rights, gender equality and the empowerment of women;”347 and, in a phrasing reminiscent of the ECOSOC norm,
“[r]equests the head of [UN Women] to continue the existing practice of effective consultation with civil society organizations, and encourages their meaningful contribution to the work of [UN Women].”348 UN Women has since developed three primary ways for civil society to participate in developing its
strategies, programs, and policies.

343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
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Raustiala, supra note 48, at 158.
Structure, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/who-we-are [http://
perma.cc/BX5K-QBYJ].
Origins and History, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/history [http://
perma.cc/WG3Y-U5VE].
G.A. Res. 64/289, ¶ 49 (July 21, 2010).
Id. at ¶ 54.
Id. at ¶ 55.
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First, UN Women’s executive board may invite NGOs in consultative status
with ECOSOC to participate in its deliberations.349 Second, individuals and
groups may join “Civil Society Advisory Groups” (CSAGs), which are talk shops
formed at national, multi-state, regional, and global levels350 to engage civil society.351 CSAG applicants may be members of academia, women’s and grassroots
communities, gender equality networks, and development or social policy think
tanks.352 It is preferred that they have “strong credentials as gender, development
and/or human rights advocates.”353 There is no provision in the CSAG guiding
principles that excludes individuals and organizations associated with business
interests, so they presumably may be accepted if they are otherwise eligible.
So far, these modes of access are rather standard. The third point of access
between the organization and nonstate actors is the one that moves UN Women
to the bottom of the vertical spectrum into the “innovator” category. In 2014, UN
Women created a Private Sector Leadership Advisory Council, which grants
membership to nonstate groups upon invitation of the UN Women executive
board. The focus of the Council is to “accelerate economic and social progress for

349.

350.

351.

352.
353.

The UN-Women Executive Board: An Informal Guide, UN WOMEN 9 (Feb. 2015), http://
www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/executive%20board
/un%20women%20executive%20board%20informal%20guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/F4EW
-LAKY].
Civil Society Advisory Groups, UN WOMEN, http://www.unwomen.org/en/partnerships/civil
-society/civil-society-advisory-groups [http://perma.cc/5ZU7-AP68] (including a list of six
regional CSAGs, twenty-nine national CSAGs, two multicountry CSAGs, and one global
CSAG).
Guiding Principles: UN Women’s Civil Society Advisory Groups, UN WOMEN 1, http://www
.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/partnerships/civil%20society
/guiding_principles_civil_society_advisory_groups.pdf [http://perma.cc/U3YQ-LXP8]
(explaining that CSAGs “build on existing close relationships and increase strategic dialogue
with civil society partners at global, regional and national levels and . . . formally recognize
civil society as one of our most important constituencies”). For membership in a CSAG, an
individual must be nominated, elected, or selected in a manner determined through consultation with “civil society networks/organizations in accordance with practices well-suited to
local and national contexts” with a focus on achieving “balanced and diverse membership.” Id.
at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
Id. The membership list for the global CSAG is published on the UN Women website; however, membership lists for the regional, national, and multicountry CSAGs are published inconsistently on regional UN Women website pages. See, e.g., UN Women Asia Paciﬁc Regional
Civil Society Advisory Group, UN WOMEN, http://asiapaciﬁc.unwomen.org/en/about-us/civil
-society-advisory-group [http://perma.cc/7KT2-TFGB]. CSAGs are also granted access to a
web-based platform to facilitate communication among themselves. Civil Society Advisory
Groups, supra note 350.
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women and girls worldwide by combining our expertise, reach and resources”;354 indeed, as far as resources go, these businesses are major ﬁnancial
contributors to UN Women.355 There are ten founding corporate leaders on the
Council, including chief executives of The Coca-Cola Company, L’Oréal, Goldman Sachs, and Unilever.356 The Council meets twice per year to review progress
and provide strategic input to guide advocacy and resource mobilization efforts.
It is unclear what, if any, additional access rights to UN Women membership in
the Council secures. It is expected that each of the corporate-sector members will
“deepen their engagement with UN Women through partnership agreements in
support of the organization’s priorities.”357 They may also sign onto the Women’s
Empowerment Principles, which offer guidance to businesses on how to support
women in the workplace, marketplace, and community.358
Other specialist innovators that similarly trade policy making and oversight
rights for ﬁnancial support are the GAVI Alliance and the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.359
***
In sum, the lobbying rules map describes a number of ideal types, but organizations instantiate those types in unique ways. Nevertheless, the common
features the typology identiﬁes are useful in evaluating tradeoffs each basic type
makes between administrability and balancing nonstate inputs, between preserving state sovereignty and capturing robust nonstate expertise and engagement, and between openness and selectiveness. These tradeoffs give rise to the
larger prescriptive hypotheses in the Section that follows.
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UN Women Launches Private Sector Leadership Advisory Council, UN WOMEN (June 2, 2014),
http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2014/6/private-sector-leadership-advisory
-council-launched [http://perma.cc/T6GL-UGSR].
See, e.g., Annual Report 2015-2016, UN WOMEN 47 (2016), http://www2.unwomen.org
/-/media/annual%20report/attachments/sections/library/un-women-annual-report-2015
-2016-en.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y6ZH-W4CK] (showing that The Coca Cola Company contributed $310,000 in 2015-16 and that other companies not on the board also contributed,
such as MasterCard, which contributed $500,000); see also id. at 41 (explaining that $20 million will be pledged by foundations and corporations to fund gender equality and women’s
empowerment).
UN Women Launches Private Sector Leadership Advisory Council, supra note 354.
UN Women’s Major Partners, UN WOMEN, http://www.unwomen.org/en/partnerships
/businesses-and-foundations/major-partners [http://perma.cc/Y83V-W7BP].
Women’s Empowerment Principles, UN WOMEN, http://www.unwomen.org/en/partnerships
/businesses-and-foundations/womens-empowerment-principles [http://perma.cc/D49D
-BYBU].
See Abbott & Gartner, supra note 10, at 4.
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B. Payoffs and Open Questions
The lobbying rules typology offers a conceptual structure to organize the Article’s main claims. The following discussion reviews those claims and proposes
potential prescriptive consequences. Most signiﬁcantly, I argue that reforms
should likely occupy the far top left and bottom right corners of the lobbying
rules map.
First, a brief summative review: Framing the current access rules as lobbying
regulation allows reformers to borrow from the toolbox of domestic regulations
in the United States and elsewhere, as well as frameworks for reform developed
by international bodies like the OECD. It also marries and cross-pollinates two
diverse scholarly traditions: 1) the highly optimistic tradition that imagines nonstate actors as legitimacy-conferring representatives of global publics, positing
that those publics can democratize international organizations and thereby enlarge their mandates;360 and 2) the highly pessimistic strand that decries lobbying as a “most serious and worrisome problem”361 and “a corruption of the democratic process,”362 which even the most globally advanced lobbying regulator
fails to adequately control.
This Part, to this point, has illustrated that access by nonstate actors to international organizations is usually more akin to lobbying than it is to democratic
voting, as the strong legitimacy-optimist position imagines. Not only are private-sector lobbying groups like trade and industry associations registered as
“consultants” or “observers” to a wide variety of institutions, but the access they
are afforded can be analogized to lobbying access, since the majority of the international structures cluster to the “classic” end of the vertical spectrum, affording
full decisional power to nation-states and various forms of controlled access and
input opportunities to nonstate actors. At the same time, some innovator organizations have begun to offer more robust forms of access to private actors in exchange for various resources those private actors can offer, like ﬁnancial resources (e.g., UN Women and GAVI); access to affected populations
(UNAIDS); or support or voluntary compliance by private-sector actors (UNCITRAL and UN Women).
Based on this analysis, I suggest the following prescriptive proposal: reforms
should push regulatory structures diagonally into opposite corners of the rules
map. That is, reforms should produce structures that fall into the generalist classic or specialist innovator categories, as shown in Table 3:

360.

See, e.g., Cardoso Report, supra note 4, at 24, 30.
361. Cohen-Eliya & Hammer, supra note 71, at 265.
362. McKinley, supra note 2, at 1158.
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TABLE 3.

Less Categorical
Access

More Categorical

Generalist Classic

Moderate Classic

Specialist Classic

Generalist Innovator

Moderate Innovator

Specialist Innovator

Participation
Membership

To start with the simplest part of this prescription, organizations should generally stay away from the generalist innovator category. The category appears to
be a null set among current international organizations and it is unlikely that any
organizations should adopt structures in this category in the future. The reason
is that a generalist innovator’s access rules would give full membership rights to
all potential entrants, of whatever interest or type. That is, individuals, NGOs,
trade and industry associations, business entities, and others would all have the
capacity to participate in the development of international rules through voting
rights or other recognized decision-making capacity. Not only would this be a
radical step under international law—dispensing with state sovereignty altogether and putting lawmaking power in the hands of individuals and sub-state
entities—it is hard to envision how an international organization could administer such a pluralist voting structure.
Next, why should more classic organizations move to the left along the horizontal spectrum? As this Article has shown, the tendency over time has in fact
been in the opposite direction: organizations have moved rightward across the
horizontal spectrum from generalist to specialist, with many access rules clustering toward the center of that spectrum. But this shift has been motivated at least
in part by strong legitimacy optimism, as lawmakers try to admit NGOs that
would help those organizations claim the legitimacy of the “global public.” In
service of this end, organizations have needed to be able to claim that those
NGOs were representative of their members, that the groups represented a balance of individuals from the global north and south, and that their leaders answered to the members.363 So organizations have implemented reforms that
erect more distinctions between different kinds of groups (they have become
more specialist) in an effort to carry out this strong legitimacy-optimist agenda.
The recent reform at the WHO is a prime example of this: the WHO wishes to

363.

See supra Section I.B.2.
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distinguish between public-interest and private-sector groups in order to regulate each separately.
The argument I have made in this Article is that this move toward more specialist organizations is ill-advised and likely will not produce the intended results. Literature examining the ECOSOC rules shows that it is difficult to determine whether a consultant group speaks for its members and to maintain a
balance of voices from the global north and south. Here and in previous work I
have built on that critique by suggesting that the presence of a signiﬁcant private-sector lobby makes it even more difficult for international organizations to
determine what interests an association represents. In particular, I have described an “astroturf activism” phenomenon, where business entities “gain access
to international lawmakers through front groups that obscure the identity of the
proﬁt-seeking enterprise that is really the relevant actor.”364 Business organizations do this by capturing existing NGOs, forming their own,365 or capturing
trade associations that purport to speak on behalf of a particular group of actors—such as an organization that purports to speak for farmers in the global
south.366 Moreover, sometimes for-proﬁt entities can escape the notice of gatekeepers and become accredited, notwithstanding their noncompliance with accreditation eligibility rules. Indeed, the nonproﬁt criterion itself is domestically
administered, and domestic administration is notably uneven.367
In short, here and elsewhere, I argue that erecting yet more categorical distinctions between different nonstate entities for the purpose of enhancing representation is a futile game because trying to reduce or eschew certain actors, like
private-sector actors, can provoke capture of NGOs, mission distortion, and covert behavior. Experience has shown that separately regulating different entities
does not appear to produce the representative participation those reforms
seek.368 Thus, moving a set of access rules toward the right-hand “specialist”
category, by adding additional categorical distinctions, will likely further sacriﬁce administrability. The WHO reform is a particularly striking example of this,
as the WHO itself is charged with reviewing applicant associations to independently assess whether there might be any potential private-sector inﬂuences
lurking that could potentially cause undue inﬂuence over WHO officials and
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state delegates.369 This imposes a heavy burden on those institutional gatekeepers to ferret out the kinds of astroturf activism the private sector will be most
eager to hide; it may also chill productive partnerships between public-interest
and private-sector groups.
Thus, the lobbying frame presents a set of tradeoffs. Officials can either (1)
recognize the “consultation” procedure as lobbying, embrace the “generalist classic” model in which they get out of the business of policing the representativeness of NGOs, and use lobbying regulatory tools like disclosure and transparency as constraints; or (2) build truly participatory multistakeholder structures
that permit a smaller number of hand-selected representatives to participate as
policymakers and members, crafting new “specialist innovator” models such as
those seen in the new global health context (e.g., GAVI, the Global Fund, UNAIDS).
The former strategy would improve administrability. Reforms would extricate admission criteria meant to enhance representativeness and accountability
and borrow domestic regulatory strategies focusing on registration and publicly
available disclosure of lobbying activities. Organizations would stop policing
motives and accountability and instead put all entrants on an equal playing ﬁeld.
Lawmakers would be charged with assessing the value of the input on its own
terms for the expertise or other functional value of the input, rather than as a
quasi-vote on a particular legal rule delivered by an unaccountable representative
of an imagined global constituency.
The latter strategy—moving to specialist innovator organizations—would
also improve administrability, but instead by radically decreasing the number of
representatives who are permitted to participate. It would move away from the
chimeric, imagined participation of the consultation process to true participation, where nonstate organizations have a voting stake in the work of the international institution. This actual stake could encourage consolidation of views
among particular kinds of stakeholders. This structure would not likely be the
right choice for all international organizations, but it could be a promising reform for some, particularly in areas where collaboration with private-sector entities is likely to produce better, more effective, or more broadly accepted legal
rules. Which strategy will be most successful for a given organization will depend on how well those nonstate collaborations will help the organization carry
out its mission.
Indeed, one might imagine plotting types of international organizations on a
third spectrum and transforming the map into a cube. This could allow predictions about where on the lobbying rules map a particular organization’s rules
ought to land, based on the distinctive needs of that organization. Organizations
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that draw substantially on private-sector assistance—for expertise, voluntary
compliance, or ﬁnancial support—may be more likely to beneﬁt from access rules
in the specialist innovator space. Organizations that require substantial support
and buy-in from national governments may be best advised to maintain “classic”
structures that preserve nation-state sovereignty over the relevant issues. Organizations like UNCITRAL may fall in the middle because they are caught in a
bind: On the one hand, they need state support in order to obtain implementation in national jurisdictions of the rules they produce. On the other hand, they
beneﬁt from private-sector expertise and will need private-sector buy-in as well,
or national jurisdictions will have trouble overcoming objections at home when
they seek to implement the rules they have developed at the international level.
Perhaps it is these factors which explain both UNCITRAL’s location in the center
of the rules map and the controversy its access rules have produced. Other organizations, like UNAIDS, have decided that it is important to give a full voting
stake to NGOs that work with populations affected by the AIDS virus. Future
efforts regarding cybersecurity, which will depend heavily on private-sector expertise, might also be excellent candidates for such an approach.
conclusion
With change comes opportunity. The early twenty-ﬁrst-century global context poses existential threats to fundamental principles of the post-World War II
order, such as the value of multilateralism, the primacy of diplomacy over military force, and the neoliberal promise of free trade. But uncertainty and change
also present fertile opportunities to transform key features of the current order.
One important feature of the changing global landscape is the relationship
between nation-states and nonstate actors. Business entities have become their
own global powers, rivaling nations in their economic and political clout. While
proﬁt motives can distort and thwart international lawmaking intended to serve
the public good, nations and international organizations also depend on business
entities for expertise, innovation, and cooperation. How should international
law respond to these facts? This Article addresses one key facet of this question.
The theory of this Article is that reframing the international accreditation
structures as a body of international lobbying law focuses reforms on means to
capture the important informational and practical contributions of all nonstate
participants—whether they be classic public-beneﬁt NGOs, industry or trade associations, business entities, or others—while introducing sunlight into the process through more functional registration and disclosure rules.
At the same time, by framing these contributions as lobbying, not participation, the theory clears away misleading assumptions that have insidiously
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thwarted deeper reforms. The lobbying framework reveals that the current international access laws preserve a clear hierarchy between national sovereigns
and nonstate entities. New multistakeholder institutions offer promising models
for areas like cybersecurity, climate change, and global health, where productive
public-private collaboration may be critical to addressing global challenges.
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